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Abstract
Over the last 12 years, the percentage of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget
spent on the procurement of services has risen consistently (Gansler, 2001). In an
attempt to maximize cost savings in the rapidly growing services sector, the DoD
established a Performance Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) strategy that focuses on
evaluating contractor performance based on their ability to meet desired outcomes rather
than the means to which the outcomes are obtained. In April 2000, Dr. Gansler, then
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, issued a
memorandum mandating that 50 percent of all eligible service acquisitions be awarded
using PBSA methods by Fiscal Year (FY) 2005. While some studies (Ausnik, Camm, &
Cannon, 2001; Ausnik, Baldwin, Hunter, & Shirley, 2002) have attempted to measure the
potential increases in quality and cost savings, very little research has been focused on
USAF implementation of PBSA and the progress and attainment of the PBSA goals.
Using multiple years of comprehensive data obtained from the Air Force
Contract Reporting System, also known as the J001, this thesis extends on previous
PBSA research (Lacey, 2004) and seeks to evaluate and analyze the current and expected
future states of PBSA implementation in the USAF, including an assessment of current
performance against PBSA goals, the development of forecasts of future performance
against PBSA goals, and the evaluation of PBSA contract characteristics. A combination
of descriptive statistics, forecasting, contingency tables, and regression were used to
analyze the data, draw conclusions, and make recommendations for PBSA
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implementation improvements. The results conclude that the USAF is not meeting
interim PBSA goals and will most likely fall short of the FY 2005 PBSA goal. These
results suggest that the goals may not have been reasonable and that the USAF has hit a
natural plateau in PBSA use.
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Performance Based Service Acquisition: A Quantitative Evaluation of Implementation
Goals and Performance in the United States Air Force

I. Introduction

Overview
The use of Performance Base Service Acquisition (PBSA) for the acquisition of
services has become increasingly prevalent in the United States Air Force (USAF) as a
result of PBSA goals. These goals were mandated in an attempt to increase service
quality and garner potential cost savings associated with the use of PBSA. While some
studies (Ausnik, Camm, & Cannon, 2001; Ausnik, Baldwin, Hunter, & Shirley, 2002)
have attempted to measure these potential increases in quality and cost savings, very little
research (for one such study see Lacey, 2004) has been focused on USAF implementation
of PBSA and the progress and attainment of the mandated PBSA goals.
Using multiple years of data, this thesis extends Lacey’s research (Lacey, 2004)
and seeks to evaluate and analyze the current and future states of PBSA implementation
in the USAF, including an assessment of current performance against PBSA goals, the
development of forecasts of future performance against PBSA goals, and the evaluation
of PBSA contract characteristics. Additionally, this thesis will provide recommendations
for PBSA implementation improvements in order to assist USAF leadership in making
decisions based on the current state of PBSA.
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Background
Over the last 12 years, the percentage of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget
spent on the procurement of services has risen consistently (Gansler, 2001). In an
attempt to increase cost savings in this rapidly growing procurement sector, the DoD
established a performance based service acquisition strategy that focuses on evaluating
contractor performance based on their ability to meet desired outcomes rather than the
means to which the outcomes are obtained. In April 2000, Dr. Gansler, then Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, issued a memorandum
mandating that, at a minimum, 50 percent of all eligible service acquisitions, measured in
both dollars and actions, be awarded using PBSA methods by Fiscal Year (FY) 2005.
In order to understand the potential benefits of PBSA, it is first important to
understand the meaning and concepts of PBSA. The Guidebook for Performance-Based
Services Acquisitions in the Department of Defense (PBSA Guidebook) defines PBSA as
acquisition strategies, methods, and techniques that describe and communicate
measurable outcomes rather than direct performance processes (DoD, 2001). Simply,
PBSA asks contractors to meet a desired outcome rather than telling them how to meet
the outcome. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 37.6 describes
characteristics consistent with PBSA designated contracts. According to FAR Subpart
37.6, performance-based contracts or task orders exhibit the following characteristics:
(1) Describe requirements in terms of results required rather than the methods of
performance of the work.
(2) Use measurable performance standards and quality assurance surveillance
plans.
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(3) Specify procedures for reduction of fee or reduction to price of a fixed price
contract when services are not performed or do not meet contract
requirements.
(4) Include performance incentives when appropriate.
Past research suggests that by utilizing these characteristics and describing
requirements in terms of performance outcomes, beneficial outcomes or objectives will
be achieved. For instance, in 1998 the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP),
which is a central office that provides direction for procurement policy and the
development of procurement systems, concluded a four year study on PBSA. According
to the study, the utilization of PBSA reduced contract prices, improved customer
satisfaction, and increased competition (OFPP, 1998). The PBSA Guidebook also
suggests potential benefits of PBSA usage by listing the five objectives that the use of
PBSA can help achieve. Quoting from the Guidebook, these five objectives are:
(1) Maximize Performance – By following its own best practices, a contractor can
deliver the required service. Since the prime focus is on the end result,
contractors can adjust their processes, as appropriate, throughout the life of
the contract without the burden of contract modifications. This adjustment
may be done as long as the delivered service (outcome) remains in accordance
with the contract. The use of incentives further motivates contractors to
furnish their best performance.
(2) Maximize Competition and Innovation – Encouraging innovation from the
supplier base by using performance requirements maximizes opportunities for
competitive alternatives in lieu of government-directed solutions. Since
PBSA allows for greater innovation, it has the potential to attract a broader
industry base.
(3) Encourage and Promote the Use of Commercial Services – The vast majority
of service requirements are commercial in nature. Use of Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) Part 12 (Acquisition of Commercial Items) procedures
provides great benefits by minimizing the reporting burden and reducing the
use of government-unique contract clauses and similar requirements, which
can help attract a broader industry base.
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(4) Shift in Risk – When contractors become responsible for achieving the
objectives in the work statement through the use of their own best practices
and processes, much of the risk is shifted from the government to industry.
Agencies should consider this reality in determining the appropriate
acquisition incentives.
(5) Achieve Savings – Experience in both government and industry has
demonstrated the use of performance requirements results in cost savings.
The interest in applying PBSA and realizing its benefits increases as the
percentage of the DoD budget spent on services continues to grow. In 1991 the OFPP
issued the first policy letter, Policy Letter 91-2, addressing PBSA. This policy letter
established policy for the Government’s acquisition of services by contract, emphasizing
the use of performance requirements and quality standards in defining contract
requirements, source selection, and quality assurance. Since the issuance of Policy Letter
91-2, multiple directives and guidance documents have been issued for both the Federal
Government and the USAF. However, it was not until Dr. Gansler’s (2000)
memorandum on PBSA that the implementation of PBSA in the USAF began to take
shape.

Problem
In order to evaluate the performance of PBSA implementation, USAF decision
makers need to know the current state of PBSA in the USAF. Furthermore, USAF
decision makers need to know whether or not mandated PBSA goals are currently being
met and will be met in the future. Additionally, USAF leadership needs to know if these
PBSA goals are reasonably attainable. Recent research on PBSA implementation in the
DoD is limited, but one study (Lacey, 2004) suggests that the USAF is not on course to
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meet mandated goals. However, Lacey’s study is extremely exploratory, using only one
year of USAF comprehensive data for analysis (Lacey, 2004).
Research Question
The over arching research question is, “What are the current and future expected
states of PBSA implementation in the USAF?” This question was answered by
conducting an evaluation and analysis of the current and future states of PBSA
implementation in the USAF using archival data obtained from the Air Force Contract
Reporting System, also known as the J001. The evaluation and analysis included the
assessment of current performance against PBSA goals, forecasting of future
performance against PBSA goals, the evaluation of PBSA contract characteristics, and
recommendations for PBSA implementation improvement.

Investigative Questions
Because the research question for this study is so broad, several investigative
questions were developed in an attempt to evaluate as many aspects of PBSA
implementation as possible, including the reliability of the J001 database. The five
investigative questions this study answers are:
IQ1. Is the J001 database, which is the source of government procurement data,
reliable?
IQ2. Is the USAF meeting interim PBSA goals?
IQ3. Is the USAF on track to meet future mandated PBSA goals?
IQ4. Is the percentage of modifications coded PBSA equal to the percentage of
non-modifications coded PBSA?
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IQ5. Are any particular acquisition characteristics associated with PBSA use?
IQ5a. What are the antecedents to the use of PBSA?
IQ5b. What are the barriers to the use of PBSA?
Investigative question one was developed in order to ensure that the database from which
the data for this study was extracted was reliable. Investigative questions two and three
were developed in order to answer the obvious questions of whether or not the USAF is
meeting interim and will meet future PBSA goals. Investigative question four was
developed in order to see if PBSA percentages are consistent for new contract awards and
modifications. This is important because a difference in the two percentages may imply
that PBSA contracts are modified more or less often than non-PBSA contracts or that
PBSA modifications are more or less costly than non-PBSA modifications. Lastly,
investigative question five was developed in order to identify contract variables that may
increase or decrease the probability of PBSA use.

Methodology
The first investigative question was formulated in order to ensure reliability of the
data manually entered into the J001 database. The J001 is a database comprised of DD
Form 350, Individual Contracting Action Report, information for all Air Force
contracting actions exceeding $25,000. Investigative question 1 was answered by taking
a sample of contracts coded PBSA in the J001 database and evaluating them against the
four mandatory criteria for PBSA identified in the PBSA Guidebook.
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Investigative questions 2 through 5 were answered by collecting data directly
from the J001, for all USAF service contracts from FY 2001 through FY 2004. The data
was analyzed using descriptive statistics, forecasting, contingency tables, and regression.

Proposed Contributions
By following the steps outlined above, this thesis will further the knowledge and
understanding of the use of PBSA in the USAF. First, it will provide insight to the
reliability of the J001 database. Secondly, it will allow USAF leadership to see how well
the USAF is meeting interim mandated PBSA goals and progressing towards future
goals. Additionally, this study will validate the establishment of mandated PBSA goals
and help decision-makers establish better future goals. Lastly, the results from this study
will help procurement personnel identify when to use PBSA.

Summary
This chapter presented the overall basic components of the research effort. First,
the background to PBSA implementation in the USAF and how it has led to the
formation of the problem statement, research questions, and subsequent investigative
questions were explained. Next, a summary of current knowledge and methodology used
to answer the investigative questions was presented. Lastly, the proposed contributions
were addressed. The following chapter will provide a review of the literature relevant to
PBSA, describing the evolution of PBSA within the Federal Government and the DoD.
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II. Literature Review

Introduction
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to the creation, implementation, and
evaluation of the Performance Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) initiative in the United
States Air Force (USAF). Besides basic definitions and an explanation of PBSA, this
chapter explains how past policy, directives, and regulations established by the Federal
Government, Department of Defense (DoD), and the USAF have led to the current state
of PBSA within the USAF acquisition and contracting community.

Federal Guidance
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 37 provides the policy and guidance
for acquisition and management of service contracts. Although the FAR does not
establish any objective PBSA goals, its contents do state that performance-based
contracting is the preferred method of acquiring services and requires the use of it to the
maximum extent practicable.
FAR Subpart 37.101 defines a service contract as, “a contract that directly
engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an
identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply (FAR Part 37).”
Additionally, the regulation notes that services can be performed by either professional or
nonprofessional personnel and on an individual or organizational basis. FAR Subpart
37.101 identifies the following disciplines where service contracts may be found:
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(1) Maintenance, overhaul, repair, servicing, rehabilitation, salvage,
modernization, or modification of supplies, systems, or equipment.
(2) Routine recurring maintenance of real property.
(3) Housekeeping and base services.
(4) Advisory and assistance services.
(5) Operation of Government-owned equipment facilities, and systems.
(6) Communications services.
(7) Architect-Engineering (see Subpart 36.6).
(8) Transportation and related services (see Part 47).
(9) Research and development (see Part 35).
It is worthy to note that, although included in the general list of services, research
and development services (FAR Part 35), architect-engineering services (FAR Part 36),
and transportation services (FAR Part 47) are governed by their respective FAR Parts in
the event of inconsistencies in the FAR (FAR Part 37). This precedence issue can
become particularly important in any attempt to determine if PBSA should be used for
the acquisition of these services.
FAR Subpart 37.102 excludes specific service type contracts, including architectengineering services, construction, utility services, and services that are identical to
supply purchases, from performance-based contracts. In addition, FAR Subpart 37.102
establishes an order of precedence for contract types when acquiring services. The order
of precedence established by FAR Subpart 37.102 for all service contracts is:
(1) A firm-fixed price performance-based contract or task order.
(2) A performance-based contract or task order that is not firm-fixed price.
(3) A contract or task order that is not performance-based.
This order of precedence suggests that the DoD’s top priority is to award service
contracts or task orders using PBSA and preferably using a FFP contract. The next
priority suggested from this order of precedence is to use PBSA with non-fixed price
contracts, such as cost reimbursement contracts. The “last resort” is to award contracts or
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task orders that are not performance-based. Although this order of precedence provides
only generalized guidance for the use of PBSA, it promotes the use of firm-fixed price
(FFP) type contracts for PBSA. However, by identifying the use of performance-based
contracts or task orders that are not FFP as a possible service contract option it can be
inferred that not all PBSA contracts need to or can be FFP.
FAR Subpart 37.6 further promotes the use of FFP contracts for “services that can
be defined objectively and for which the risk of performance is manageable (FAR Part
37).” This FAR Subpart also prescribes the policies and procedures for the use of PBSA,
including but not limited to, the proper preparation of a PBSA Statement of Work
(SOW), quality assurance, and the use of positive and negative performance incentives.
Furthermore, according to FAR Subpart 37.6, PBSA contracts:
(1) Describe requirements in terms of results required rather than the methods of
performance of the work.
(2) Use measurable performance standards and quality assurance surveillance
plans.
(3) Specify procedures for reduction of fee or reduction to price of a fixed price
contract when services are not performed or do not meet contract
requirements.
(4) Include performance incentives when appropriate.
In 1974, Public Law 93-400 required the Office of Management and Budget,
through its Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), to establish a system for
collecting, developing, and disseminating procurement data, which took into account the
needs of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the public (United States Congress, 1974).
This law led to the creation of the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), now a
requirement under FAR Subpart 4.6. The FPDS provides a comprehensive mechanism
for assembling, organizing, and presenting contract placement data for the Federal
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Government. Subsequently, the DoD created the Defense Contract Action Data System
(DCADS) which transmits all DoD procurement data to the FPDS. In order to collect the
appropriate data for the DCADS, the DoD created the DD Form 350, Individual
Contracting Action Report, which is required for all delivery/task orders exceeding
$25,000. The DD Form 350 includes information about not only the type of action, but
also numerous other contractor socio-economic characteristics, such as business size and
ethnic ownership. The USAF collects and transmits all DD Form 350 information to
DCADS via the Air Force Contract Reporting System, also known as the J001. The DD
Form 350 and the related procurement databases are valuable sources for information
pertaining to how the DoD, and specifically the USAF, spends taxpayer money.
In 1991 the OFPP issued the first policy letter directed towards PBSA, Policy
Letter 91-2. This letter established policy for the Government’s acquisition of services
by contract, emphasizing the use of performance requirements and quality standards in
defining contract requirements, source selection, and quality assurance. The letter states,
It is the policy of the Federal Government that (1) agencies use performancebased contracting methods to the maximum extent practicable when acquiring
services, and (2) agencies carefully select acquisition and contract administration
strategies, methods, and techniques that best accommodate the requirements
(OFPP, 1991).
Once again, the preference for the use of FFP contracts rather than cost reimbursement
contracts is emphasized for instances where services can be objectively defined and risk
is manageable. However, the policy letter also clearly states that all contracts, regardless
of contract type, shall include incentive provisions to ensure that contractors are rewarded
for good performance and penalized for unsatisfactory performance. This provision adds
to the more basic requirements of FAR Subpart 37.6, which never mandates the use of
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fee or price reductions for unsatisfactory performance, but simply states to, “include
performance incentives when appropriate (FAR Subpart 37.6).”
In the infancy of PBSA implementation, some agencies began to rely on
contractors to perform certain functions in such a way as to raise questions about who
was creating Government policy, the Government or private contractors (OFPP, 1992).
In addition, the amount of control over contract performance being transferred to
contractors began to be questioned. In light of this, the OFPP issued Policy Letter 92-1,
establishing Executive Branch policy relating to service contracting and inherently
governmental functions in order to avoid unacceptable transfer of official responsibility
to Government contractors. Policy 92-1 specifically defined an inherently governmental
function as:
[A] function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
performance by Government employees. These functions include those activities
that require either the exercise of discretion in applying Government authority or
the making of value judgments in making decisions for the Government. (OFPP,
1992)
The policy letter noted that while certain functions, such as facility maintenance and food
services, may be performed by contractors, other functions, such as the command of
combat troops may not. However, the policy letter made a point not to specify legally
which functions are inherently governmental or define the factors used to make such a
determination by using non-binding terminology, such as “may” or “might.” This
intentional lack of specifics in identifying inherently governmental functions may cause
internal debate over the use of contractors to perform non-standard services, but it also
allows governmental agencies the flexibility to use creative contracting methods,
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including the use of PBSA, when acquiring services in order to meet mission
requirements.
A 1993 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agency review
revealed that service contracting practices and capabilities were uneven across the
Executive branch (OFPP, 1994). In response, the OFPP issued Policy Letter 93-1. This
policy letter established Government-wide policy, assigned responsibilities, and provided
guiding principles for Executive Departments and agencies in managing the acquisition
and use of services. In addition, the policy letter uses the “best practices” concept to
guide government agencies towards the use of a more results-oriented approach to service
contracting. This “best practices” concept ultimately led to the creation of FAR Subpart
37.5, which allowed contracting officials, for the first time, legally to use practical
techniques gained from experience to improve the procurement process (FAR Subpart
37.5).
In a further attempt to encourage the use of PBSA and a more results-oriented
approach, in 1997 the OFPP distributed a PBSA checklist in order to aid in developing
performance-based solicitations, contracts or task orders, and to assist in determining
whether existing solicitations, contracts, or task orders may be appropriately classified as
performance-based (OFPP, 1997). The checklist provides the minimum elements
required for an acquisition to be considered PBSA. Once again, the OFPP purposefully
made the checklist vague and open to interpretation in order to avoid infringing on the
authority or discretion of contracting officers. Like FAR Subpart 37.6, the checklist
identifies four minimum requirements for PBSA. These requirements are:
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(1) Performance requirements that define the work in measurable and missionrelated terms.
(2) Performance standards tied to the performance requirements.
(3) A Government quality assurance plan that describes how the contractor’s
performance will be measured against the performance standards.
(4) If the acquisition is either critical to agency mission accomplishment or
requires relatively large expenditures of funds, positive and negative
incentives tied to quality assurance plan measurements.
Although not exactly the same, these requirements are similar to the four PBSA criteria
identified by FAR Subpart 37.6. Furthermore, the instructions within the checklist assert
that the checklist is only one of many tools available to assist in the developing of PBSA
contracts.
In 1998 the OFPP concluded a four year study of PBSA and published a report of
its findings titled, “A Report on the Performance-Based Service Contracting Pilot
Project.” The study included twenty-six non-PBSA contracts, ranging from $100,000 to
$325 million. These contracts, all of which were due to expire, were resolicited using
PBSA methods. Before-and-after measurements were taken and the results clearly
demonstrated PBSA’s benefits (OFPP, 1998). According to the report, PBSA reduced
contract prices an average of 15% at all price ranges and across all types of services.
More importantly, PBSA was particularly effective when cost-reimbursement non-PBSA
contracts were converted to FFP PBSA contracts. In the forward of the report Mr.
Franklin Raines, OMB Director, encouraged agency officials to expand the use of and
actively promote PBSA in order to capture the potential billions of dollars in savings
(OFPP, 1998). Although this was yet another attempt to encourage the use of PBSA, it
was the first influential directive supported by factual dollar savings data.
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In the wake of the PBSA pilot project and its significant findings, the OFPP
rushed to issue the “Guide to Best Practices for Performance-Based Service Contracting.”
Using the results from the PBSA pilot study as a foundation, the document contains
suggested best practices derived from the experiences of contracting personnel in both the
government and commercial sector. The document is not a mandatory regulation nor is it
a “how to” manual, but it is a tool to assist in developing policies and procedures for
implementing PBSA (OFPP, October 1998).
For the next few years, the Federal Government, outside of the DoD, provided
little documented PBSA direction until March of 2001, when then OMB Deputy Director,
Sean O’Keefe, issued a memorandum to all department heads and agencies urging them
to make greater use of PBSA contracts. This memorandum established a goal for FY
2002 that, for all contract amounts over $25,000, no less than 20 percent of the total
eligible service contracting dollars be awarded using PBSA techniques (O’Keefe, 2001).
This marked the first officially documented PBSA goal established by the Federal
Government, outside of the DoD.
The first documentation to require by law that the DoD meet a goal of 50% PBSA
of services by FY 2005 was the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY
2002, Sections 801-803. Section 801 of the NDAA covers management of the
procurement of services and includes the requirement for data collection; including
service purchased, total dollars, type of contract, business size, and the extent of
competition; Section 802 establishes DoD PBSA performance goals (United States
Congress, 2002). This section specifies the following minimum usage of performance
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based purchasing using firm fixed prices for specific tasks, calculated on the basis of
dollar value:
For FY 2003, a percentage no less than 25 percent
For FY 2004, a percentage no less than 35 percent
For FY 2005, a percentage no less than 50 percent
For FY 2011, a percentage no less than 70 percent
Lastly, Section 803 discusses the use of competition in all multiple award
contracts above $100,000, reemphasizing the need for competition in the awarding of
service contracts, specifically PBSA contracts.
In response to sections 801 through 803 of the NDAA for FY 2002, which
established a series of requirements impacting the acquisition of services in the
Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, Mr. Edward Aldridge, issued a memorandum to all secretaries of the military
departments providing policy guidance and establishing a review structure and process
for the acquisition of services in accordance with section 801(d) (Aldridge, 2002). The
attachments to this memorandum include a review of Department of Defense acquisition
of services, which is intended to outline the review policy for the acquisition of services
and ensure service acquisitions are based on clear, performance-based requirements, that
required outcomes are identified and measurable, and that the acquisitions are properly
planned and administered to achieve intended results.
Realizing that agencies were making only moderate progress toward PBSA
implementation, the OFPP established a PBSA interagency working group and published
the results and finding in a July 2003 report titled, “Interagency Task Force on
Performance-Based Service Acquisition.” The group was established in order to obtain a
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broader understanding of the requirements of PBSA and to identify ways to increase
PBSA usage (OFPP, 2003). As a result of their findings the group recommended
modifying the FAR in order to increase flexibility in applying PBSA, modifying
reporting requirements to ensure appropriate PBSA application, and improving the
quality, currency, and availability of PBSA guidance. Although acting Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Mr. Michael Wynne did address
these recommendations in an August 2003 memorandum, but as of March, 2005, none of
the recommended modifications to the FAR have been published (Wynne, 2003).
However, changes in reporting requirements and an increase in quality, currency, and
availability of PBSA guidance has been implemented through the use of web-based
technology.
While the OFPP and other federal government agencies were attempting to
encourage and provide guidance for the use of PBSA within the government, the DoD
and USAF were busy trying to align their directives and instructions with federal
guidance in order to meet mandated PBSA requirements. These efforts are discussed in
the following section of the chapter.

Department of Defense (DoD) and United States Air Force (USAF) Guidance
In an effort to promote PBSA within the Air Force acquisition and contracting
community, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
Management published Air Force Instruction (AFI) 63-124 “Performance-Based Service
Contracts” in 1999. Upon its release, AFI 63-124 replaced AFM 64-108 “Service
Contracts” and AFI 63-504 “Quality Assurance Evaluator Program” as the governing
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guidance for service contracting. This new AFI removed numerous mandated processes,
empowering field personnel with the freedom needed to embrace agile acquisition and
procurement transformation (DAF, 1999). This AFI revolutionized the expectations and
methods of contracting for services in the USAF and aligned Air Force guidance with the
PBSA initiatives established by the OFPP. This AFI was later amended in February of
2004 by way of an Interim Change to AFI 63-124. This interim change deleted
Attachment 2 of AFI 63-124, the criteria for exemption to performance-based service
contracts, leaving only the services listed under FAR Part 37.102 exempt from PBSA
(DAF, 2004). This change not only increases the number of services eligible for PBSA,
but also the percentage of dollars. At first glance, it seems as if this will help agencies
meet PBSA goals, when in reality, it may make achievement of PBSA goals more
difficult because more services are eligible, thus more services must be converted to
PBSA.
In April 2000, the Under Secretary of Defense of Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, Dr. Jacques Gansler, issued an official memorandum addressing the use of
PBSA in the DoD. In this memorandum Dr. Gansler stated that the use of performancebased acquisition strategies for services was among his highest priorities (Gansler, 2000).
This memorandum mandated that, at a minimum, 50 percent of service acquisitions,
measured in both dollars and actions, be PBSA by FY 2005. From the memorandum it is
unclear whether contract modification actions for service contracts should be used for the
purpose of PBSA percentage calculations. At any rate, Dr. Gansler’s goal was set forth
nearly one year before any other federally mandated PBSA goals, suggesting that the
DoD’s implementation of PBSA was more advanced than other agencies. In addition to
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the goals, the memorandum outlines policy guidance, implementation planning, training
initiatives, and other department-wide PBSA initiatives in order to help guide agencies
towards the accomplishment the PBSA goal.
In response to Dr. Gansler’s requirements, the USAF issued its own “PBSA
Implementation Plan.” This plan provided guidance for identification of services eligible
for PBSA including; maintenance, repair, operations and support, modifications,
modernizations, and medical services (DAF, 2000). More importantly, the
implementation plan established the requirement of tracking PBSA implementation
progress through automated systems. This requirement of PBSA tracking is what allows
researchers the opportunity to conduct quantitative studies and analysis on USAF
implementation of PBSA.
The DoD issued The Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisitions in
the Department of Defense (PBSA Guidebook) in 2001 in order to help acquisition teams
better understand the basic principles of PBSA, better implement performance-based
strategies and methodologies into service acquisitions, and meet the goals set forth by Dr.
Gansler’s 2000 memorandum (DAF, 2001). Major topics include market research,
developing a performance-based work statement and establishing measurable
performance standards, incentives and remedies, contractor performance management,
source selection considerations, and contract administration. The PBSA Guidebook also
identifies the following minimum elements needed in order for an acquisition to be
considered performance-based:
(1) Performance Work Statement – The performance work statement describes
the requirement in terms of measurable outcomes rather than by means of
prescriptive methods.
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(2) Measurable Performance Standards – To determine whether performance
outcomes have been met, measurable performance standards define what is
considered acceptable performance.
(3) Remedies – Remedies are procedures that address how to manage
performance that does not meet performance standards. While not mandatory,
incentives should be used, where appropriate, to encourage performance that
will exceed performance standards. Remedies and incentives complement
each other.
(4) Performance Assessment Plan – This plan describes how contractor
performance will be measured and assessed against performance standards.
(Quality Assurance Plan or Quality Surveillance Plan).
As shown in Table 1, the criteria established by the PBSA Guidebook, although not
exactly the same, parallel PBSA criteria established by other publications.
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Table 1. PBSA Criteria for PBSA Guidebook, PBSA Checklist, and FAR Part 37.6
PBSA Guidebook
PBSA Checklist
FAR Part 37.6
1) Describe requirements
1) Performance
1) The performance work
in terms of results required
requirements that define
statement describes the
the work in measurable and rather than the methods of
requirement in terms of
performance of the work.
measurable outcomes rather mission related terms.
than by means of
prescriptive methods.
2) To determine whether
performance outcomes have
been met, measurable
performance standards
define what is considered
acceptable performance.

2) Performance standards
tied to the performance
requirements.

2) Use measurable
performance standards and
quality assurance
surveillance plans.

3) Remedies are procedures
that address how to manage
performance that does not
meet performance standards.
While not mandatory,
incentives should be used,
where appropriate, to
encourage performance that
will exceed performance
standards. Remedies and
incentives complement each
other.

3) A Government quality
assurance plan that
describes how the
contractor's performance
will be measured against
the performance standards.

3) Specify procedures for
reduction of fee or
reduction to price of a
fixed price contract when
services are not performed
or do not meet contract
requirements.

4) This plan describes how
contractor performance will
be measured and assessed
against performance
standards.

4) If the acquisition is
either critical to agency
mission accomplishment or
requires relatively large
expenditures of funds,
positive and negative
incentives tied to quality
assurance plan
measurements

4) Include performance
incentives when
appropriate.

Lastly, the highlight of the guidebook is the “Top-Level Guiding Principles” section that
summarizes the 49-page document into eleven bullets, emphasizing performance based
methods and incentives based on well-defined results-oriented requirements.
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In early 2003, the USAF issued The Management and Oversight of Acquisition of
Services Process (MOASP), implementing section 801 of the NDAA for FY 2002. The
guidance appoints the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Services (AFPEO/SV)
(now the AFPEO for Combat & Mission Support (CM)) as the designated official to
review all service acquisitions, except major weapon system and space program
acquisitions (DAF, 2003). Additionally, the guidance states that the AFPEO/SV may
delegate management and review responsibilities to Major Command (MAJCOM)
designated officials, which then may further delegate these authorities. This verbiage
becomes significant when determining what constitutes a performance-based service. If
such determination is delegated to different agencies within different MAJCOMs,
inconsistencies in PBSA determinations may surface.
In August 2003, a memorandum from the acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Mr. Michael Wynne, urged the Department of
Defense to continue increasing the use of PBSA because such acquisitions provide
significant benefit to the government (Wynne, 2003). Included in the memorandum are
interim goals he asks each military department to work towards in an effort to meet the
goal of awarding 50 percent of all contract actions and dollars using performance-based
specifications by FY 2005. Mr. Wynne’s PBSA goals were;
FY 2003
FY 2004
FY 2005

25 percent of dollars awarded
35 percent of dollars awarded
50 percent of dollars awarded

Although these goals were not legislated, they do offer a road map for expected PBSA
progression for all military departments, including the USAF.
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Over the last few years it looked as if the DoD was well on its way to
implementing PBSA and meeting mandated goals. According to a 2002 GAO testimony
by then Acting Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Mr. William Woods,
about 23 percent of eligible service contracts were reported to be performance-based
during FY 2001 (Woods, 2002). However, in August 2003, Michael Wynne, claimed
that the DoD is making progress towards FY 2005 goal of 50 percent of contract actions
awarded using performance-based specifications due to the fact that in FY 2002 over 20
percent of the service requirements were awarded using performance-based specifications
(Wynne, 2003). If both of these statements are correct, it shows that the DoD may have
made minimal progress from FY 2001 to FY 2002, but still seems to have met the FY
2003 goal of 25 percent. However, recent research (Lacey, 2004) suggests that the FY
2005 goal of 50% will not be met by either the DoD or the USAF.

Other Literature
Previous research and commercial literature on PBSA is limited. However, the
RAND Corporation’s Project AIR FORCE division, which is an Air Force federally
funded research and development center for studies and analysis, has conducted a few
studies directed towards implementation, use, and effectiveness of PBSA.
The first study, titled, “Performance-Based Contracting in the Air Force: A
Report on Experiences in the Field,” was completed in January 2001 and looked at
examples of successful USAF applications of PBSA. Twenty-two recently awarded
contracts from “self-selected” bases that identified themselves as examples of successful
implementation of PBSA practices were studied. The results concluded that most bases
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were very happy with the performance selected using PBSA practices. However, only
two bases attributed the success in obtaining contractor performance to the use of new
acquisition practices. Additionally, changes in costs resulting from PBSA practices were
difficult to determine because a) many of the new contracts’ scope of work was different
from the work in the old contracts, b) it is difficult to determine the accuracy of
government cost estimates associated with an acquisition, and c) it is difficult to measure
changes in internal costs, such as costs incurred in the preparation and administration of a
contract using PBSA. (Ausnik, Camm, & Cannon, 2001)
The second study, titled, “Implementing Performance-Based Services Acquisition
(PBSA): Perspectives from an Air Logistics Center and a Product Center,” focused on the
application of PBSA practices at program offices that support weapon systems, common
subsystems, and special mission capabilities, rather than operational offices that mainly
provide installation support services. Unlike installation support services that are
traditionally commercial in nature and have widely accepted performance standards,
many services purchased by program offices have limited opportunities for performance
evaluation and determination of successful outcomes because many of the desired results
of a service are not always known in advance. The study found that Air Logistic Centers
and Product Centers are having difficulties satisfying the PBSA criteria described in AFI
63-124 for the use of “measurable performance standards” because they interpret the
criteria to mean that a desired result must be known in advance in order to measure
performance. However, research concluded that both Centers are using performance
based approaches by successfully applying the other three criteria described in AFI 63124. (Ausnik, Baldwin, Hunter, & Shirley, 2002)
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Private Sector Literature
Private sector literature on performance-based service contracts is limited. This
may be due to the fact that in the private sector, only 5 to 20 percent of the total external
procurement budgets are used to procure services (Barry, 2003). This is a small
percentage considering in FY 1999, the dollar amount spent by the DoD on services
equaled the amount spent on supplies/systems (Gansler, 2001). Despite, the limited
emphasis placed on private sector procurement of services, some guidance on
performance-based contracts outside of the DoD does exist.
In an Inside Supply Management article from June 2003, Jack Barry reveals that’s
there is a private sector approach to building performance based-contracts that has been
proven successful when contracting for several different types of services, including
health/insurance, transportation, engineering, advertising and legal services. The article
illustrates that an effective performance-based contract must identify the following key
factors for success:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Baseline establishment
Escalators and audits
Incentives
Performance measures

Although not identical, these factors for success are similar to PBSA criteria identified
for government procurement. Baseline establishment involves the development of a
range of acceptable performance that is based on market research and historical trends in
the industry. Performance should then be measured against these baselines, just as
government PBSA contracts measure performance against established performance
standards (Barry, 2004). Private incentives are similar to government incentives and
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should entice the supplier to reduce costs. Barry notes that sharing of savings tends to be
a strong incentive (Barry, 2004). The only factor that truly differs from government
PBSA guidance is escalators and audits. Escalators include adjustment clauses that allow
baseline prices to be readjusted upward or downward according to predetermined factors
and indices (Barry, 2004). Auditing simply entails reviewing documentation associated
with adjustment of costs.
In 2000, a commercial advisory firm, named Stqandish Group, traveled to four
different cities and hosted a total of 14 workshops in an attempt to explore and answer the
question, “Will performance-based contracts increase project success and reduce waste?”
According to Stqandish Group forecasts, commercial firms and government agencies
wasted over $100 billion in consulting fees during 2000 (Johnson, 2000). Although
government agencies were included in the $100 billion figure, the firm’s study focused
specifically on the commercial sector of contracted services. While the study was unable
to substantiate any of their findings quantitatively, the advisory firm did publish the
information gathered from workgroup participants, including benefits of performancebased contracts and how to implement them. According to their research, implementing
a performance-based contract is a five step process, which includes:
Step 1: Define project scope and objectives.
Step 2: Define success metrics.
Step 3: Establish baselines.
Step 4: Measure results.
Step 5: Implement incentives and penalties.
Once again, these steps are very similar to the process used by the government when
establishing PBSA contracts, hinting that the same methods used by the government also
apply to commercial purchasing practices.
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Summary
This chapter described the literature relevant to the creation, implementation, and
evaluation of PBSA. Besides basic definitions and explanations of PBSA, this chapter
explained how past policy, directives, and regulations established by the Federal
Government, Department of Defense (DoD), and the USAF have led to the current state
of PBSA within the USAF acquisition and contracting community.
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III. Methodology

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research methodology used to answer
the question, “What are the current and expected future states of Performance Based
Service Acquisition (PBSA) implementation in the United States Air Force (USAF)?”
The majority of the data for this effort were extracted from the Air Force Contract
Reporting System, also know as the J001. The J001 is a database comprised of DD Form
350, Individual Contracting Action Report, inputs for all Air Force contracting actions
exceeding $25,000. This thesis evaluates and analyzes the current and expected future
states of PBSA implementation in the USAF, including the assessment of current
performance against PBSA goals, the forecasting of future performance against PBSA
goals, and the evaluation of PBSA contract characteristics. This chapter includes the
research problem, investigative questions, data gathering, data reliability, data analysis,
and summary.

Research Problem
Since Dr. Gansler, then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, mandated that 50 percent of all eligible service acquisitions, measured in
both dollars and actions, be awarded using PBSA methods by Fiscal Year (FY) 2005,
little has been done to measure the implementation of PBSA or the progress towards Dr.
Gansler’s goal. In order to evaluate the performance of PBSA implementation, USAF
decision-makers need to know the current state of PBSA in the USAF. Furthermore,
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USAF decisions makers need to know whether or not mandated PBSA goals have been
and will be met.
This study addresses the question: What is the current and future state of PBSA
implementation in the USAF? Several investigative questions were developed to help
answer this research question. The five investigative questions this study answers are:
IQ1. Is the J001 database, which is the source of government procurement data,
reliable?
IQ2. Is the USAF meeting interim PBSA goals?
IQ3. Is the USAF on track to meet future mandated PBSA goals?
IQ4. Is the percentage of modifications coded PBSA equal to the percentage of
non-modifications coded PBSA?
IQ5. Are any particular acquisition characteristics associated with PBSA use?
IQ5a. What are the antecedents to the use of PBSA?
IQ5b. What are the barriers to the use of PBSA?
These investigative questions were answered using descriptive statistics, forecasting,
contingency tables, and regression.

Research Design
In order to properly address the research problem, two research designs were
utilized in this study; a time series design using archival data and correlational research.
A time series is a large series of observations made on the same variable consecutively
over time (Shadish, Cook, Campbell, 2002). For this study numerous variables were
observed over time, with an emphasis placed on PBSA contract coding. Just like many
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other time series data, the data for this study came from an archive, the J001 database.
Gaining access to archival data for research use can sometimes be difficult (Shadish,
et.al., 2002). However, by having a sponsor (AFMC/PK) that was willing to grant
access to the needed archival data, the researcher was confident that obtaining data from
the archival database would not be an issue. This archival data extracted from the J001
database for FY 2001 through 2004 was the foundation for answering all five
investigative questions.
Correlational research involves examining how differences in one characteristic
or variable relate to differences in one or more other characteristics or variables (Leedy
and Ormrod, 2001). In this type of research, surface relationships are examined without
necessarily probing for the causal reasons underlying them (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).
A correlation is deemed to exist when the increase or decrease in one variable, results in a
predictable increase or decrease of another variable (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). Through
the use of statistical tools, such as contingency tables and regressions, this study searched
for correlations between PBSA and other contract variables.

Data Gathering
The majority of the data for this effort, and the data used to answer investigative
questions two through five, were extracted from the Air Force Contract Reporting
System, also know as the J001. The J001 is a database comprised of DD Form 350,
Individual Contracting Action Report, inputs for all Air Force contracting actions
exceeding $25,000. All DD Form 350 data that are input, collected, and transmitted is
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considered primary data, which are often the most valid form of data (Leedy and Ormrod,
2001).
The data in the J001 database needed for this study was queried using Air Force
Materiel Command’s (AFMC) Contracting Business Intelligence System (CBIS), which
receives updates from the J001. Identifying and extracting only the contracting actions
that were services-related was done by isolating block B12A, Federal Stock Class (FSC)
or Service (SVC) Code, on the DD Form 350. FY 2001 was the first year the form DD
350 contained a block for coding of PBSA. On the DD Form 350, block B12A is a four
position alphanumeric code. All FSC codes contain only numeric designations, while all
SVC codes start with an alpha designation. In order to extract only the SVC coded
contracting actions, a search was conducted for all actions where B12A was between
A000 and Z999. The resulting contracting actions, all of which were services-related,
were extracted from the database and transferred to an excel document. While highly
unlikely, it is possible some PBSA coded contracts used FSC codes by mistake.
However, because of the low probability of occurrence, no attempt to extract these
contracts was made.
Due to the size and complexity of the information contained on each DD Form
350, not all blocks on the form were extracted for analysis. Table 2 shows the variables
extracted form the database.
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Table 2. DD Form 350 Variables Extracted from the J001 Database.
B1A – Contract Number
B1C – Bundled Contract
B1D – Bundled Contract Exception
B1E – Performance-Based Service Contract
B3 – Action Date
B4 – Completion Date
B6A – City or Place Code
B8 - Obligated or Deobligated Dollars
B10 – Multi-Year Contract
B11 – Total Estimated Contract Value
B12A – FSC or SVC Code
B12D – NAICS Code
B13A – Contract/Order
B13B – Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract
B13E – Multiple Award Contract Fair
Opportunity

B13F – Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use
C1 - Synopsis
C2 – Reason Not Synopsized
C3 – Extent Competed
C5 – Type of Contract
C8 – Solicitation Procedures
C9 – Authority for Other Than Full &
Open Competition
C14 – Commercial Items
D1A – Type of Entity
D1B – Women-Owned Business
D1C – HUBZone Representation
D1D – Ethnic Group
D4A – Type of Set-Aside
D4B – Type of Preference
D7 – SBIR Program

The researcher first reviewed all variables for applicability to this study. Variables were
eliminated based not only on their pertinence to PBSA, but also their frequency of use.
For example, Report Number and Recovered Material Clauses, were eliminated from
consideration because both are seldom used and have no relationship to PBSA. Next,
variables that are typically included in contracting metrics, such as type of service, dollar
amount, business size, and contract type, were selected for extraction. Then I included
socio-economic variables, such as Women-Owned Business, HUBZone Representation,
and Ethnic Group. While these socio-economic variables are most likely not correlated
with the use of PBSA, they were selected in order to check for any unusual or compelling
relationships. Curiosity was the driver for extraction of a few variables. On the surface
theses variables were expected to have no correlation to PBSA. However, no
determination can be made until they are tested. These variables include Multiple Award
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Fair Opportunity, Bundled Contract, and Bundled Contract Exception. Before finalizing
the selection of variables, a member of the research committee reviewed and agreed that
the variables identified by the researcher for extraction from the J001 database were
appropriate.

Variable Descriptions
This section provides a description of possible responses and expected
relationships to PBSA for each variable extracted from the J001 database. This
information was obtained from the Contract Action Reporting System FY04 Training and
Desk Guide (Office of Procurement Management, 2003). Because socio-economic
variables, such as Type of Entity, Women-Owned Business, HUBZone Representation,
Ethnic Group, Type of Set-Aside, Type of Preference, and SBIR Program, have no
practical correlation to PBSA, no expected relationships were noted.
Contract Number. This is a 13-character alphanumeric designation procurement
identification number. This variable is used for informational purposes only and was not
tested for relationships with PBSA.
Bundled Contract. This variable is coded “Y” when the contract meets the
definition of “bundled contract” and the contract value exceeds $5 million. This variable
is coded “N” when code “Y” dose not apply. This variable was expected to have a
negative correlation with PBSA use when coded “Y” because in order for a bundled
contract to be performance-based, a majority of the consolidated contracts would have
also had to be performance-based.
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Bundled Contract Exception. If Bundled Contract is coded “N”, this variable is
left blank; otherwise one of the following codes is entered:
Code A – The procurement is mission critical and the agency has determined that
the consolidation of requirements is critical to the agency’s mission.
Code B – The agency used the OMB Circular A-76 process to determine that the
consolidation of requirements is necessary and justified.
Code C – Codes A and B do not apply
This variable was expected to have a negative correlation with the probability of PBSA
because it’s dependent on the coding of “Y” for Bundled Contract.
Action Date. The year, month, and day of fiscal obligation. Although descriptive
in nature, it was expected that this variable, over time, would have a positive correlation
with PBSA. This was expected because it was assumed that PBSA percentages were
going to increase over time.
Completion Date. The year, month, and day of the last contract delivery or the
end of the performance period. Although descriptive in nature, it was also expected that
this variable, over time, would have a positive correlation with PBSA. This was expected
because it was assumed that PBSA percentages were going to increase over time.
Obligated or Deobligated Dollars. This variable is the net amount of funds
obligated or deobligated by the contracting action. This variable was expected to have a
positive correlation with PBSA as the value increased. This was expected because the
complex nature of PBSA contracts implies that the time and effort needed to establish a
PBSA contract would not be done for smaller dollar contracts.
Mult-Year Contract. This variable is coded “Y” when the contracting action is a
multi-year contract and coded “N” when code “Y” does not apply. It was expected that
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this variable would have no correlation with PBSA because most multi-year contracts are
avoided when at all possible.
Total Estimated Contract Value. This variable is the net amount of the total
estimated contract value at the time of the initial contract. This includes placement of an
indefinite-delivery or multi-year contract. Additionally, this variable includes the total
estimated value of orders and option anticipated over the life of the contract. This
variable was expected to have a positive correlation with PBSA for the same reasons
indentified for Obligated or Deobligated Dollars.
FSC or SVC Code. This variable is the 4-characrter code that describes the
contract effort. Each effort falls into one of three categories; Supplies, Services, or
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation. This variable was expected to have a
positive correlation with PBSA when general base services, such as grounds maintenance
or custodial services, were selected. R&D services were expected to have a negative
correlation with PBSA because of their seldom use of performance-based contracts in the
past.
NAICS Code. This variable stands for the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) and also helps identify the product of service. It is important to note
that more than one code may apply. This variable was expected to act similar to FSC or
SVC Code because it is a function of the FSC or SVC Code.
Contract/Order. This variable is coded using one of the following eight codes:
Code 1 - Letter Contract. Code 1 is entered when the contracting action is a letter
contract or a modification to a letter contract that has not been definitized.
Code 3 - Definitive Contract. Code 3 is entered when the contracting action is the
award or modification of a definitive contract or a modification that definitizes a
contract.
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Code 4 - Order under an Agreement. Code 4 is entered when the contracting
action is an order or definitization of an order under an agreement other than a
blanket purchase agreement.
Code 5 - Order under Indefinite-Delivery Contract. Code 5 is entered when the
contracting action is an order, including a task or delivery order, under an
indefinite-delivery contract awarded by a Federal agency, such as a GSA
indefinite-delivery contract.
Code 6 - Order under Federal Schedule. Code 6 is entered when the contracting
action is an order under a GSA or VA Federal Supply Schedule, or a call against a
blanket purchase agreement established under a GSA or VA Federal Supply
Schedule.
Code 7 – Blanket Purchase Agreement Order under Federal Schedule. Code 7 is
entered when the contracting action is a BPA order under a GSA or VA Federal
Supply Schedule.
Code 8 - Order from Procurement List. Code 8 is entered when the contracting
action is an action placed with Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) or a JWOD
Participating Nonprofit Agency.
Code 9 - Award under FAR Part 13. Code 9 is entered when the contracting
action, including an action in a designated industry group under the Small
Business Competitiveness Demonstration Program, is an award using simplified
acquisition procedures.
This variable was expected to have negative correlation with PBSA when coded “4”, “5”,
“6”, “7”, or “8.” This was expected because PBSA contracts are rarely used when
placing an order off of an existing contract.
Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract. This variable is coded using one of the
following three codes when Contract/Order is coded “Order” for the variable IndefiniteDelivery Contract:
Code A – The action pertains to a requirements contract.
Code B – The action pertains to an indefinite-quantity contract.
Code C – The action pertains to a definite-quantity contract.
Because indefinite delivery contracts are seldom PBSA, it was expected that this variable
would have a negative correlation with PBSA use.
Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity. This variable is coded using one of
the following five codes:
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Code A - Fair Opportunity Process. Code A is entered when the delivery or task
order was issued pursuant to a process that permitted each contract awardee a fair
opportunity to be considered.
Code B - Urgency. Code B is entered when the agency need is so urgent that
providing a fair opportunity would result in unacceptable delays.
Code C - One/Unique Source. Code C is entered when only one contract awardee
is capable of providing the supplies or services at the level or quality required
because the supplies or services are unique or highly specialized.
Code D - Follow-On Contract. Code D is entered when the order was issued on a
sole-source basis in the interest of economy and efficiency as a logical follow-on
to an order already issued under the contract.
Code E - Minimum Guarantee. Code E is entered when it was necessary to place
an order to satisfy a minimum amount guaranteed to the contractor.
This variable was expected to have a positive correlation with PBSA when “A” was
coded because, according to the literature, PBSA increases competition, thus enhancing
fair opportunity processes.
Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use. This variable is coded using one of the four
following codes if Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract was coded and the action is the
initial placement of an indefinite-delivery contract:
Code A – The contract can be used Government-wide.
Code B – The contract can be used within the DoD only.
Code C – The contract can be used within the department only.
Code D – The contract can be used by the contracting office only.
Because indefinite delivery contracts are seldom PBSA, it was expected that this variable
would have a negative correlation with PBSA use.
Synopsis. This variable is coded using one of the three following codes:
Code A – Only a synopsis of the proposed action was prepared.
Code B – A combined synopsis/solicitation of the proposed action was prepared.
Code N – A synopsis was not prepared.
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This variable was expected to have a negative correlation with PBSA when coded “N”
because PBSA is best used in competitive circumstances. Not preparing a synopsis limits
the notification of upcoming solicitations, thus limiting competition.
Reason Not Synopsized. This variable is left blank unless Synopsis is coded “N.”
If Synopsis is coded “N” then this variable is coded using one of the three following
codes:
Code A – The action was not synopsized due to urgency.
Code B – The action was not synopsized because the acquisition was made
through another means that provided access to the notice of the proposed action
through a single, Government-wide point of entry.
Code Z – The action was not synopsized due to some other reason.
This variable was expected to have a negative correlation with PBSA because not
synopsizing results in limited competition.
Extent Competed. This variable is coded using one of the four following codes:
Code A – The action was competed.
Code B – The action is not available for competition.
Code C – The action is a follow-on to competed action.
Code D – The action was not competed.
Because PBSA is best used in competitive circumstance, codes “A” and “C” for this
variable were expected to have a positive correlation with PBSA and codes “B” and “D”
were expected to have a negative correlation.
Type of Contract. This variable identifies the type of contract utilized for the
action and is coded using one of the 12 following codes:
Code A - Fixed-Price Redetermination.
Code J - Firm-Fixed-Price.
Code K - Fixed-Price Economic Price Adjustment.
Code L - Fixed-Price Incentive.
Code M - Fixed-Price-Award-Fee.
Code R - Cost-Plus-Award-Fee.
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Code S - Cost Contract.
Code T - Cost-Sharing.
Code U - Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee.
Code V - Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee.
Code Y - Time-and-Materials.
Code Z - Labor-Hour.
It was expected that this variable would have a positive correlation with PBSA when
coded “J” because firm-fixed price contracts have been identified in the literature as the
ideal contract types for PBSA. Conversely, all the cost-plus contract types were expected
to have a negative correlation with PBSA because the use of these types of contracts is
discouraged and not conducive to PBSA methods.
Solicitation Procedures. This variable is left blank if the action is pursuant
simplified acquisition procedures or is an order or call under a Federal schedule.
Otherwise, the variable is coded using one of the following nine codes:
Code A - Full and Open Competition Sealed Bid.
Code B - Full and Open Competition--Competitive Proposal.
Code C - Full and Open Competition--Combination.
Code D - Architect-Engineer.
Code E - Basic Research.
Code F - Multiple Award Schedule.
Code G - Alternative Sources.
Code K - Set-Aside.
Code N - Other than Full and Open Competition.
Because PBSA is best used in competitive circumstance, codes “B” and “C” for this
variable were expected to have a positive correlation with PBSA and code “N” was
expected to have a negative correlation. Additionally, PBSA is not appropriate for sealed
bidding and is not required for architect-engineering services; therefore codes “A” and
“D” were also expected to have a negative correlation with PBSA.
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Authority for Other Than Full and Open Competition. This variable is left blank
unless Solicitation Procedures is coded “N.” If Solicitation Procedures is coded “N” then
one of the following 14 codes is used:
Code 1A - Unique Source.
Code 1B - Follow-On Contract.
Code 1C - Unsolicited Research Proposal.
Code 1D - Patent or Data Rights.
Code 1E - Utilities.
Code 1F - Standardization.
Code 1G - Only One Source--Other.
Code 2A - Urgency.
Code 3A - Particular Sources.
Code 4A - International Agreement.
Code 5A - Authorized by Statute.
Code 5B - Authorized Resale.
Code 6A - National Security.
Code 7A - Public Interest.
Because PBSA is best used in competitive circumstance this variable was expected to
have a negative correlation with PBSA.
Commercial Items. This variable is coded “Y” for yes or “N” for no depending
on the inclusion of FAR clause 52.212-4, Contract Terms and Conditions—Commercial
Items, in the contract. If this clause is in the contract then the action was awarded as a
commercial item and thus is code “Y.” Because commercial items cover such a broad
range of services, the researcher was unsure what effect, if any, this variable would have
on PBSA.
Type of Entity. This variable describes the type of business entity the action was
awarded to and is coded using one of the following 11 codes:
Code A - Small Disadvantaged Business (SDB) Performing in U.S.
Code B - Other Small Business (SB) Performing in U.S.
Code C - Large Business Performing in U.S.
Code D - JWOD Participating Nonprofit Agency.
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Code F - Hospital.
Code L - Foreign Concern or Entity.
Code M - Domestic Firm Performing Outside U.S.
Code T - Historically Black College or University (HBCU).
Code U - Minority Institution (MI).
Code V - Other Educational.
Code Z - Other Nonprofit.
Women-Owned Business. This variable identifies whether or not the contractor
identifies themselves as a women-owned business and is coded “Y” for yes, “N” for no,
or “U” for uncertified.
HUBZone Representation. This variable identifies whether or not the contractor
represented that it is a HUBZone small business concern and is coded “Y” for yes and
“N” for no.
Ethnic Group. This variable identifies the ethnic group for the contractor, if
applicable. This variable is left blank unless the action is with a small disadvantaged
business. Otherwise one of the following seven codes is used:
Code A - Asian-Indian American.
Code B - Asian-Pacific American.
Code C - Black American.
Code D - Hispanic American.
Code E - Native American.
Code F - Other SDB Certified or Determined by SBA.
Code Z - No Representation.
Type of Set-Aside. This variable identifies the type of set-aside used and is coded
using one of the following 11 codes:
Code A - None.
Code B - Total SB Set-Aside.
Code C - Partial SB Set-Aside.
Code D - Section 8(a) Set-Aside or Sole Source.
Code E - Total SDB Set-Aside.
Code F - HBCU or MI - Total Set-Aside.
Code G - HBCU or MI - Partial Set-Aside.
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Code H - Very Small Business Set-Aside.
Code J - Emerging Small Business Set-Aside.
Code K - HUBZone Set-Aside or Sole Source.
Code L - Combination HUBZone and 8(a).
Type of Preference. This variable identifies the type pf preference given to small
businesses and is coded using one of the following five codes:
Code A - None.
Code B - SDB Price Evaluation Adjustment--Unrestricted.
Code C - SDB Preferential Consideration--Partial SB Set-Aside.
Code D - HUBZone Price Evaluation Preference.
Code E - HUBZone Price Evaluation Preference and SDB Price Evaluation
Adjustment.
SBIR Program. This variable identifies whether or not the action is related to the
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program and if so, what phase of it. This
variable is coded using the following four codes:
Code A - Not a SBIR Program Phase I, II, or III.
Code B - SBIR Program Phase I Action.
Code C - SBIR Program Phase II Action.
Code D - SBIR Program Phase III Action.

Data Reliability
Despite its wide use, the J001 and other federal procurement databases have been
proven to have their flaws. A 2003 report from the General Accounting Office (GAO)
noted, “FPDS data are inaccurate and incomplete (Woods, 2003).” For instance, in the
2001 review the GAO found that the value of contracts awarded to HUBZone firms could
have been hundreds of millions of dollars different than reported (Woods, 2003). They
also found instances where multiple orders were reported as a single transaction. For
instance, an order reported as $11,443,000 should have been reported as 87 separate
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actions at or below $25,000 (Woods, 2003). Because of these inaccuracies, the GAO has
been unable to assess the implementation of procurement programs and limited its
reliance on FPDS data. The GAO found similar inaccuracies with the Department of
Defense’s data system, which feeds information into FPDS. However, in the report no
details were given on the specifics of the DoD’s inaccuracies.
Of the problems noted in the GAO findings, none specifically pertained to the use
or coding of PBSA. The only remark suggesting possible problems with proper coding
of PBSA actions included, “In some cases, those processing the data did not have a
complete understanding of the information requirements.” This remark suggests that
some contracting actions may or may not be being coded PBSA accurately. Another
GAO report further supports the possibility of inappropriate coding of federal
procurement data by noting there are inconsistencies in the interpretation of the definition
of performance based contracts (Woods, 2002). In addition, personal experiences by the
researcher suggest that time constraints, pressure to meet procurement goals, and a
general lack of emphasis on proper coding may also attribute to inaccuracies in the
databases.
Builders of the input system for the DD Form 350 realized that there was a
possibility for user error when inputting procurement information. In order to counter
this, the system has built-in error checking capability. For instance, if block B1C,
Bundled Contract, is coded “N” for no, the system will not allow you to code an
exception in block B1D, Bundled Contract Exception. Although this coding check
capability does not account for subjective coding decisions, it does add to the overall
reliability of the data.
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Data Analysis
AFI 63-124, the guiding document for USAF PBSA, states that all services
contracts over the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT), which has been listed at
$100,000 during the years pertaining to this study, are eligible for PBSA, excluding the
services listed in FAR Subpart 37.102 (DAF, 2004). The services excluded from PBSA
use include architect-engineering services, construction, utility services, and services that
are identical to supply purchases (FAR Part 37). Because these services are not eligible
for PBSA and none of them were coded PBSA, they were removed from the J001 data by
identifying and deleting the corresponding service code categories. All services, with the
exception of R&D type services, and construction work are broken up into the 23 major
categories listed in Appendix A. Each category has been assigned a four position code,
also known as SVC code, starting with a letter followed by three numbers. The letter
identifies the major category and the numbers identify the specific service within each
category. All contracts that have a SVC code that begins with the alpha designation “C”
are architect and engineering service contracts. All contracts that have a SVC code that
begins with the alphanumeric designations “S1” are utility service contracts. All
contracts that have a SVC code that begins with the alpha designation “Y” are
construction contracts. Accordingly, all actions where block B12A, FSC or SVC, began
with C, S1, or Y were removed. After removing all exempt services, the remaining
contracting actions, all of which were greater than $100K and not excluded under FAR
Subpart 37.102, were analyzed.
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The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, forecasting, regression, and
contingency tables. The following sections describe how these methods were used to
answer the five investigative questions.
Investigative Question 1. In order to determine the reliability of the J001, and
answer investigative question 1, a stratified random sample of PBSA contract files were
obtained from three different contracting offices located at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base (WPAFB). These offices included 88 ABW/PK, AFRL Det 1/PK, and ASC/PK.
These three offices were selected because they each perform a different contracting
function for the USAF. The 88th ABW/PK is an operational contracting squadron that
primarily supports base operations; ASC/PK supports a variety of weapon systems
related requirements, and AFRL Det 1/PK contracts primarily for research and
development (R&D) efforts. Together these offices handle a wide variety of contracts,
from standard firm fixed price base custodial contracts to complex cost reimbursable
R&D contracts to major weapon-system related contracts.
The goal was to evaluate at least 30 randomly selected contracts from each office.
In order to ensure an appropriate amount of contracts were selected from each office, the
contracts were first stratified. Using the data from the J001, all PBSA coded contract
data from each office was identified using each office’s unique Department of Defense
Activity Address Code (DoDAAC) and office code. The DoDAAC is an alpha numeric
designation that is always the first six designations of a contract number and is usually
the same for all contracts in a particular office. The office code is a unique alpha numeric
designation identifier that helps track actions performed by a particular office and is
required when completing a form DD 350.
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Once the contract data for each office was identified, extracted, and sorted by date
of action, a random sample for each office was generated using a random number
generator software program tool. Those contracts randomly selected were requested for
review. In some instances the contracting offices were unable to locate a contract file
because they were a) already staged away in storage at a different location, b) currently
being used, c) classified, or d) simply unable to be located. In these instances, a
replacement contract from the randomized list was identified and substituted.
The stratified sample of service contracts coded PBSA in the J001 was then
evaluated against the four PBSA contract criteria identified in The Guidebook for
Performance-Based Services Acquisitions in the Department of Defense (PBSA
Guidebook). The criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook were selected in lieu of the
four PBSA criteria identified in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) because,
unlike the FAR, the PBSA Guidebook criteria is a minimum mandatory requirement and
was published by Dr. Gansler, the same person that established the FY 2005 goal that
50% of all services be performance based. According to the PBSA Guidebook, in order
for an acquisition to be considered performance-based, it must meet the following
minimum requirements:
(1) Performance Work Statement – The performance work statement describes
the requirement in terms of measurable outcomes rather than by means of
prescriptive methods.
(2) Measurable Performance Standards – To determine whether performance
outcomes have been met, measurable performance standards define what is
considered acceptable performance.
(3) Remedies – Remedies are procedures that address how to manage
performance that does not meet performance standards. While not mandatory,
incentives should be used, where appropriate, to encourage performance that
will exceed performance standards. Remedies and incentives complement
each other.

46

(4) Performance Assessment Plan – This plan describes how contractor
performance will be measured and assessed against performance standards.
(Quality Assurance Plan or Quality Surveillance Plan).
All evaluations were conducted by the researcher, who is Level II Certified in
Contracting through the Acquisition Professional Development Program, and considered
a subject matter expert in PBSA. For the purposes of this study, contracts were evaluated
on the existence of the four PBSA factors mentioned above. A contract was determined
to be correctly coded PBSA if it contained all four PBSA criteria, even if not named
exactly as stated in the PBSA Guidebook. For instance, a Statement of Work (SOW) that
described the requirement in terms of measurable outcomes was considered to meet the
first criteria of the PBSA Guidebook, even though it was not named a Performance Work
Statement (PWS). A contract was determined to be incorrectly coded PBSA if it did not
meet one or more of the four PBSA criteria. Because determining when performance
incentives are appropriate is so subjective and the use of incentives is so infrequent, the
third PBSA criterion, “Remedies,” was assumed to have been correctly applied for all
PBSA contracts.
Additionally, all PBSA coded contracts from AFRL were evaluated, not using the
criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook, but using the determinations made in AFRL’s
Management and Oversight of Acquisition of Services Processes (MOASP). Prior to
May 7, 2004, all Research and Development (R&D) contracts had followed the
requirements for supplies (AFRL, 2004). However, because AFRL’s R&D requirements
are inherently performance-based, they drafted their own MOASP describing how they
meet the principles of AFI 63-124. AFRL’s MOASP was approved by the Air Force
Program Executive Officer for Combat & Mission Support (AFPEO/CM) and authority
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to act as the Designation Official for the management and oversight of all services
acquisitions within AFRL was delegated to the AFRL commander. Therefore, as of May
7 2004, all AFRL R&D contracts are considered services and coded PBSA in accordance
with the approved AFRL MOASP. (DAF, AFRL MOASP, 2003)
Under the AFRL MOASP, R&D contracts meet the principles of AFI 63-124
because:
1) Contractor written SOWs in response to Government issued objectives,
describe work in terms of what the required output is rather than how the work
is to be performed.
2) Oversight between the objective and outcome is accomplished through the
selection of appropriate reporting requirements, such as Contract Data
Requirements Lists (CDRLs), Program Management Reviews (PMRs),
Technical Management Reviews (TMRs), electronic management information
systems, and interaction between the contractor and the government.
3) Deliverables may be final reports, prototypes, other hardware or software, etc.
The sample of AFRL contract files were evaluated against these criteria in the same
manner the other offices’ contracts were evaluated.
Lastly, all PBSA service contracts for Contractor Engineering and Technical
Services (CETS) covered by AFI 21-110, Engineering and Technical Services, were
evaluated in accordance with Supplement 1 to AFI 63-124, which states that the
surveillance requirements of AFI 63-124 do not apply (DAF, Sup 1, 1999). AFMC
MOASP dated February 2004 rescinded this exception. Therefore, all CETS contracts
prior to February 2004 were evaluated on only one criteria; the existence of a
performance work statement that described the requirement in terms of measurable
outcomes rather than by means of prescriptive methods.
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Once the contract evaluations were complete, a large sample, one-tailed test about
a population proportion was used to statistically test the reliability of the sample and
answer the question of whether PBSA coded contracts are coded consistent with the
minimum mandatory criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook (McClave, et al., 2001).
Ideally all PBSA contracts would be coded correctly. However, like any other process
there are bound to be mistakes, or defects, in coding of contracts. Because of this, an
acceptable threshold was established. The researcher felt that PBSA coding could be
considered reliable if less than 10% of the PBSA contracts were coded incorrectly.
Inferences about population proportion, or percentages, can be made in the
context of the probability, p, of success or failure for a binomial distribution (McClave, et
al., 2001). For this study p represented the percentage of PBSA contracts that did not
meet the mandatory minimum criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook. Additionally,
po represented the hypothesized percentage of PBSA contracts that did not meet the
mandatory minimum criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook and was equal to .10.
The sample proportion is simply the sample mean of the outcomes of the trials.
According to the Central Limit Theorem, the sample mean is approximately normally
distributed for large samples. Therefore, the standard normal z was able to be used for
the test statistic:
Test Statistic: z = Sample proportion – Null hypothesized proportion
Standard deviation of sample proportion
=

pˆ − po

σ p̂
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The symbol σ p̂ equals pq , where pq is estimated by poqo, qo = 1 - po, and n is the sample
n

size.
However, before conducting any type of hypothesis test, the researcher had to
check to determine whether the sample size was large enough to use the normal
approximation for the sampling distribution of the sample proportion, p̂ (McClave, et al.,
2001). In order to use the large sample test of hypothesis about a population proportion,
the sample size must be large enough that interval po ± 3 σ p̂ does not include 0 or 1. This
ensures that the sample size is large enough to assume that the normal distribution will
provide a reasonable approximation of p̂ (McClave, et al., 2001). As long as this interval
is completely contained in the interval 0 to 1, the normal approximation for the sampling
distribution of p̂ is reasonable. If at least 30 samples from each of the three offices were
evaluated, the total number of samples, n, would be equal to 90. With 90 samples and a
po of .10, interval po ± 3 σ p̂ equals .10 ± .095 or (.005 and .195), both of which do not
include 0 or 1.
Finally, in order to statistically test the reliability of the DD Form 350 data and
answer the question of whether or not PBSA coded contracts are coded consistent with
the minimum mandatory criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook, the following null
and alternate hypotheses were established (Bain and Englehardt, 1987):
Null hypothesis #1 (Ho1): p ≥ .10
Alternate hypothesis #1 (Ha1): p < .10
For this test an alpha (α) of .01 was used. α represents the significance level, or the
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact true, also known as a Type I
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error (McClave, et al., 2001). Using the standard normal distribution, the appropriate
rejection region for the specified value of α was found. Using α = .01, the one-tailed
rejection region is:
Rejection region: z < -z.01 = -2.33
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected if the value of the test statistic, z, was less
than -2.33, thus falling in the rejection region.
Investigative Question 2. In order to answer investigative question 2, the
following hypotheses were established:
Null hypothesis #2 (Ho2): The USAF is meeting interim PBSA goals.
Alternate hypothesis #2 (Ha2): The USAF is not meeting interim PBSA goals.
The actual percentage of eligible dollars awarded using PBSA were compared to
the interim PBSA goals established by the acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Mr. Michael Wynne. Mr. Wynne’s goals did not
address the percentage of actions PBSA, only the percentage of dollars PBSA. These
interim PBSA goals are included below.
FY 2003
FY 2004

25 percent of dollars awarded
35 percent of dollars awarded

The following sub-hypotheses were established in order to address the goals for
each FY and assist in determining whether to accept or reject null hypothesis #2:
Null hypothesis #2a (Ho2a): FY 2003 Actual % of Dollars PBSA ≥ 25 %.
Alternate hypothesis #2a (Ha2a): FY 2003 Actual % of Dollars PBSA < 25%.
Null hypothesis #2b (Ho2b): FY 2004 Actual % of Dollars PBSA ≥ 35 %.
Alternate hypothesis #2b (Ha2b): FY 2004 Actual % of Dollars PBSA < 35%.
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Because the data represents the whole population of PBSA eligible contracts, if during
any year the actual percentage of eligible dollars awarded using PBSA were less than the
interim PBSA goals then the null hypothesis was rejected.
Investigative Question 3. Forecasting using simple linear regression and a twoperiod moving average were used in order to answer investigative question 3. Because
the number of data points (4) was limited, the researcher opted to use more than one
forecasting method. Despite the use of two forecasting methods, the significance of the
forecasts was expected to be limited due to the few data points available.
With simple linear regression a straight-line model is used to relate a times series,
Yt, to time, t (McClave, et al., 2001). For this study Yt was the percentage of PBSA
dollars or actions and t was the FY. Using this model, a least squares line can be
calculated and used to forecast future values of Yt (McClave, et al., 2001). The straightline model is as follows:
E(Yt) = β0 + β1t
Where β0 is the intercept and β1 is a population parameter. This model can be
fitted using the method of least squares, where the sum of squared errors between the
predicted and actual values is smaller than any other straight-line model (McClave, et al.,
2001). The least squares model looks identical to the straight-line model, except for least
square estimators are substituted for the population parameters. The least square model is
as follows:
E(Yt) = β̂ 0 + β̂ 1t

52

Moving averages forecast for future time periods using the mean of past
observations (Makridakis, Wheelwright, & McGee, 1978). With a two-period moving
average, only the mean of the last two observations is use to forecast for the value of the
next time period (Makridakis, Wheelwright, & McGee, 1978). For this study, the mean
of the percentages for FY 2003 and 2004 will be used to forecast the percentage for FY
2005.
Using the simple liner regression model, moving averages, and the following
hypotheses, the researcher forecasted for the percentage of PBSA dollars and actions for
FY 2005:
Null hypothesis #3 (Ho3): The USAF will meet the mandated FY 2005 goal of
50% of all eligible service dollars and actions awarded using PBSA.
Alternate hypothesis #3 (Ha3): The USAF will not meet the mandated FY 2005
goal of 50% of all eligible service dollars and actions awarded using PBSA.
Null hypothesis #3a (Ho3a): The FY 2005 % of dollars PBSA ≥ 50%
Alternate hypothesis #3a (Ha3a): The FY 2005 % of dollars PBSA < 50%
Null hypothesis #3b (Ho3b): The FY 2005 % of action PBSA ≥ 50%
Alternate hypothesis #3b (Ha3b): The FY 2005 % of actions PBSA < 50%
If either forecasted percentage of dollars or actions PBSA for FY 2005 was less than
50%, then the null sub-hypothesis was rejected. If any of the null sub-hypotheses were
rejected then null hypothesis #4 was also rejected.
Investigative Question 4. In order to answer investigative question 4, the
following hypotheses were established:
Null hypothesis #4A (Ho4 dollars): The percentage of modifications, measured in
dollars, coded PBSA is equal to the percentage of non-modifications, measured in
dollars, coded PBSA.
Alternate hypothesis #4A (Ha4 dollars): The percentage of modifications, measured
in dollars, coded PBSA is not equal to the percentage of non-modifications,
measured in dollars, coded PBSA.
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Null hypothesis #4B (Ho4 actions): The percentage of modifications, measured in
actions, coded PBSA is equal to the percentage of non-modifications, measured in
actions, coded PBSA.
Alternate hypothesis #4B (Ha4 actions): The percentage of modifications, measured
in actions, coded PBSA is not equal to the percentage of non-modifications,
measured in actions, coded PBSA.
Because the whole population was used when computing the percentages, there was no
need to use a statistical test to determine a difference between modifications and nonmodifications. The researcher decided that a 5 percent difference of either dollars or
actions in any FY was significant. Therefore, the decision to accept or reject the null
hypothesis was determined by comparing the percentage of modifications coded PBSA to
the percentage of non-modifications coded PBSA for FY 2001 through FY 2004. In
order to make this comparison, the following sub-hypotheses were established for each
FY:
Null hypothesis #4a (Ho4a 2001dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4a (Ha4a 2001dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4a (Ho4a 2001actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4a (Ha4a 2001actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4b (Ho4b 2002dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4b (Ha4b 2002dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4b (Ho4b 2002actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4b (Ha4b 2002actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4c (Ho4c 2003dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4c (Ha4c 2003dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4c (Ho4c 2003actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4c (Ha4c 2003actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4d (Ho4d 2004dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4d (Ha4d 2004dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4d (Ho4d 2004actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4d (Ha4d 2004actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
If the difference for any year was greater than 5 percent, then the null hypothesis for that
year was rejected. If any of the null sub-hypotheses were rejected then null hypothesis #4
was also rejected.
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Investigative Question 5. Contingency tables and logistic regression were used to
answer investigative question 5. However, before running any analysis, the variables
extracted from the J001 database were evaluated on their likeliness of producing
significant correlational results. Immediately, three variables were eliminated from
further analysis because their data is primarily descriptive in nature. These variables
were Action Date, Completion Date, and City or Place Code. All remaining variables
were analyzed.
All nominal variables were tested for dependency with PBSA using contingency
tables. Contingency tables are a statistical model used for multi-nomial data and provide
a determination of dependence (McClave, et al., 2001). Therefore, the two continuous
variables in the data set, Obligated or Deobligated Dollars and Total Estimated Contract
Value, were not tested using this statistical tool. Contingency tables provide observed
counts of occurrences, expected counts of occurrences, frequencies for each cell, row,
and column, probabilities for each cell, row, and column. Contingency tables are
constructed by listing all the possible outcomes of one variable as rows in a table and the
possible outcomes of the other variable as columns, then finding the frequency and
probability for each cell. The cell frequencies and probabilities are then summed across
both rows and columns. The sums are placed in the margins, the values of which are
called marginal frequencies and marginal probabilities (McClave, et al., 2001). The lower
right hand corner value contains the sum of the row and column marginal frequencies and
marginal probabilities. The sum of the marginal frequencies must be equal to N, the total
number of trials, and the sum of the marginal probabilities must be equal to 1 (McClave,
et al., 2001). Conservative sources maintain that cells that have an expected value of 5 or
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less must be removed because they will cause inconsistencies in the table (McClave et al.,
2001). However, others (Cochran, 1954) maintain that data does not need to be removed
as along as at least 80% of the expected cell counts are 5 or more and no expected cell
count is less than 1.
The chi-square (χ2) statistic is a test statistic used to analyze count data (McClave,
et al., 2001) Using χ2, a determination of dependency between two classifications can be
made (McClave, et al., 2001). For this study the two classifications were the contract
variable PBSA and a particular contract variable of interest. Each contract variable, or
classification, was tested against PBSA in order to determine dependency. If the two
variables are dependent, knowing one should increase the probability of knowing the
other. In order to test for dependency, the following hypotheses were established:
Null hypothesis #6 (Ho6): Variable “x” and PBSA are independent
Alternate hypothesis #6 (Ha6): Variable “x” and PBSA are dependent
The test was conducted for each nominal variable. However, before accepting or
rejecting the null hypothesis, a chi-square alpha (χ2α) needed to be established. For this
test an alpha of .01 was used. The next thing needed in determining χ2α was the degrees
of freedom (df). The following equation was used to calculate the df for each variable:
df = (r-1)(c-1)
Where r equals the number of rows and c equals the number of columns in the
contingency table. Using a χ2 table, a χ2α for each variable was established based on each
variable’s df and an α of .01. Finally, χ2 and χ2α were compared. If χ2 was greater than
χ2α the null hypothesis of independence was rejected and the alternate hypothesis of
dependence was accepted. (McClave, et al., 2001)
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Lastly, it is important to note that while contingency tables can determine
dependency between two classifications, they do not establish the extent of the
dependency or the existence of a causal relationship between the two classifications
(McClave, et al., 2001).
The continuous variables and all the variables that were found to be dependent
with PBSA using contingency tables were further analyzed using logistic regression.
Logistic, also known as categorical, regression is performed when data is both
quantitative and qualitative in nature and the dependent variable has only two possible
outcomes (binary) (McClave, et al., 2001). The dependent variable in this study, which is
whether a contract action is PBSA, is qualitative and has only two possible outcomes,
“Y” for yes or “N” for no. It is common to use the terms success and failure for these
types of binary responses (Agresti and Finlay, 1997). With the exception of Obligated or
Deobligated Dollars and Total Estimated Contract Value, all other independent variables
are qualitative and can be described in binary or multi-nomial form.
When the dependent variable is binary, the probability, p, that the dependent
variable, y, is response level j is estimated by dividing the total sample count, n, into the
total of each response level nj, and is written:
Pj=nj/n
This model serves the same role for a binary response as the sample mean does for
continuous models. (McClave, et al., 2001)
Ordinary least squares regression models the mean of the response variable. With
a binary response variable, the model describes how the proportion of successes depends
on the independent variables (Agresti and Finlay, 1997). Pi (π) usually denotes the true
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proportion of successes and also represents the probability that a randomly selected
subject has a success response that varies according to the dependent variables (Agresti
and Finlay, 1997). The logistic regression model is:
Log (π /(1- π)) = α + β X + ε
Where [π /(1- π)] is the odds ratio, α is the intercept, β is the parameter of the dependent
variable, X, and ε is the error. In this model, as π increases from 0 to 1, the odds ratio
increases from 0 to ∞ and the logit increases from -∞ to ∞ (Agresti and Finlay, 1997).
Additionally, a π value greater than .5 has a positive logit value and π values less than .5
have a negative logit value (Agresti and Finlay, 1997).
The null hypothesis that β = 0 and the independent variable, X, has no effect on
the probability, π, of a success, can be tested using either a z test statistic, which is the
estimate of β divided by the standard error, or the square of the z statistic, which is called
the Wald statistic (Agresti and Finlay, 1997). The Wald statistic can be used in this
instance because it has a χ2 distribution with df = 1 and and the same P-value as the z
statistic. Rejection of the null hypothesis results in acceptance of the alternate hypothesis
that β ≠ 0. In order to test each variable in this study, the following hypotheses were
established:
Null hypothesis #5 (Ho5): The parameter for variable “x” equals zero.
Alternate hypothesis #5 (Ha5): The parameter for variable “x” does not equal
zero.
The determination to accept or reject the null hypothesis was based on each computed χ2
and corresponding α value. For this test, the significance level was set at .01.
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Another test frequently used is the likelihood-ratio test. This test can be used to
compare two models by testing that the extra parameters in the complete model equal
zero (Agresti and Finlay, 1997). Negative log-likelihood is the negative sum of logs of
the observed probabilities. The negative log-likelihood plays the same role as sums of
squares does for continuous data, but for categorical data (Agresti and Finlay, 1997).
Twice the value of the negative log-likelihood (-loglikelihood) also has a distribution that
is approximately a χ2 distribution (Agresti and Finlay, 1997). Therefore, the χ2 test can be
used to test the null hypothesis that removing all the variables from the model leaves the
likelihood of observing the sample unchanged. This test is analogous to the F-test for R2
in multiple regression which tests whether or not the improvement in the model
associated with the additional variables is statistically significant (Agresti and Finlay,
1997). If we are able to reject the null hypothesis, we have evidence that at least one of
the variables does have an effect on the response.
R2 (U), the uncertainty coefficient, measures the total uncertainty that is attributed
to the model and is calculated using the following formula:
R2 (U) =

− log likelihood (difference)
− log likelihood (reduced )

Negative log-likelihood (difference) is the difference between the likelihood using the
full model and the likelihood using a model with no variables. Negative log-likelihood
(reduced) is likelihood using no variables in the model. R2 (U) values must be between 0
and 1. An R2 (U) of 1 means that the factor completely predicts the categorical response;
an R2 (U) of 0 means there is no gain by using the model over using fixed responses
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(McClave, et al., 2001). It is important to note that high R2 (U) values are rare in
categorical models (JMP, 2003).

Validity and Reliability
Validity and reliability of a measurement instrument influence the probability that
you will obtain statistical significance in your data analysis, and the extent to which you
can draw meaningful conclusions from your data (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). While
efforts were made to make this study as valid and reliable as possible, there are still some
validity and reliability concerns.
The validity pertains to the accuracy, meaningfulness, and credibility of the
research effort as a whole (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). Most texts separate validity into
two categories; internal and external.
Internal validity is the extent to which a researcher can draw an accurate
conclusion about relationships within the data based on the research design (Leedy and
Ormrod, 2001). Because the data from the J001 was not personally gathered, but rather
queried from an existing database, there is little that can be done to counter any internal
validity concerns, the largest being construct validity. Construct validity is the extent to
which an instrument measures a characteristic that cannot be directly observed, but must
be inferred (Leedy and Ormrod, pg 98). Personal experience by the researcher suggests
that time constraints, pressure to meet procurement goals, and a general lack of emphasis
on proper coding may attribute to inaccuracies in PBSA coding in the J001. Although
this study does not measure these influences, it does test and analyze the extent of
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possible validity concerns by evaluating a sample of PBSA coded contracts against the
PBSA criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook.
External validity is the extent to which a study’s results apply to situations beyond
the study itself (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). Two areas of this study have external validity
concerns. First, the contracts evaluated from the three WPAFB contracting offices
represent only a sample of PBSA coded contracts. While this study does not contend that
the sampled PBSA contracts from these three offices are a proper representation of all
PBSA contracts in the USAF, the study does maintain that the contracts evaluated are a
reasonable representation and sample of all the PBSA coded contracts in those respective
offices. Secondly, because only the services above $100,000 not excluded from PBSA
use were analyzed in this study, results and conclusions drawn from this study do not
apply to services less than or equal to $100,000 or services excluded from PBSA use.
Although services falling in these categories are not required to be procured using PBSA
techniques, these techniques are encouraged and sometimes used when it is deemed
applicable. How and if these actions differ from eligible actions is unknown. However,
because many of these actions are relatively insignificant in dollar amount compared to
the entire sum of the actions, it is assumed they would have little to no effect on the
cumulative calculations.
The reliability of a measurement instrument is the extent to which it yields
consistent results when measuring characteristics that have not changed (Leedy and
Ormrod, 2001). The proven analysis tools of logistic regression and contingency tables
do not hinder the reliability of the study, but there are some reliability concerns with the
data in the J001 database. The two previously mentioned GAO reports alluded to these
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reliability concerns within all government procurements databases. While it is
impossible to counter any subjective decisions incorrectly made by individuals inputting
data into the database, it is possible to assess the reliability, which is done by sampling
PBSA coded contracts. However, because the sample only looks at PBSA, the reliability
of other DD350 characteristics is not accounted for.

Summary
Chapter 3 discusses the research problem, investigative questions, data gathering,
data reliability, data analysis, and validity and reliability. Chapter 4 will address the
results and analysis, findings based on the results and analysis, and any conclusions that
can be drawn from the findings.
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IV. Results and Analysis

Introduction
This chapter describes the research results and answers to each of the five
investigative questions. Referenced throughout the chapter are multiple appendices that
provide more detailed breakouts of the research results. Included in these appendices are
spreadsheets that separate PBSA actions and dollars by Service Category, Type of
Contract, and Type of Entity. These appendices can be found at the end of this thesis.

Data Analysis
Investigative Question 1. In order to answer investigative question 1, the
following hypotheses were established:
Null hypothesis #1 (Ho1): p ≥ .10
Alternate hypothesis #1 (Ha1): p < .10
Although the goal was to evaluate only 30 PBSA contracts from each of the three offices,
the researcher managed to evaluate a total of 102 contracts; 36 from AFRL Det 1/PK, 34
from 88ABW/PK, and 32 from ASC/PK. Of the 102 contracts evaluated, 3 were
determined not to meet the minimum mandatory criteria identified in the PBSA
Guidebook. Therefore, the z test statistic was calculated using n = 102 and p̂ = 3/102, or
0.029. Substituting the values into the test statistic, a z value of -2.38 was obtained.
Test Statistic: z =

pˆ − po

σ pˆ
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=

.029 − .1
(.1)(.9)
102

= -2.38
Because the calculated z value is less than -2.33, which is the cut-off for the
rejection region, the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence at
the .01 level of significance to indicate that, for the three offices sampled, fewer than
10% of the PBSA contracts were coded incorrectly. Even though this test can only be
generalized to the three offices the samples were drawn from, the results indicate that
there may not be systematic problems in PBSA coding throughout the USAF.
Investigative Question 2. In order to answer investigative question 2, the
following hypotheses were established:
Null hypothesis #2 (Ho2): The USAF is meeting interim PBSA goals.
Alternate hypothesis #2 (Ha2): The USAF is not meeting interim PBSA goals.
Additionally, the following sub-hypotheses were established in order to assist in
answering investigative question 2.
Null hypothesis #2a (Ho2a): FY 2003 Actual % of Dollars PBSA ≥ 25 %.
Alternate hypothesis #2a (Ha2a): FY 2003 Actual % of Dollars PBSA < 25%.
Null hypothesis #2b (Ho2b): FY 2004 Actual % of Dollars PBSA ≥ 35 %.
Alternate hypothesis #2b (Ha2b): FY 2004 Actual % of Dollars PBSA < 35%.
Table 3 displays that in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 the USAF exceeded the interim goal of
25% by awarding over 32% of its contracts using PBSA, a difference of over 7%.
However, for FY 2004 the USAF awarded only 28.75% of its contracts using PBSA;
when compared to the goal of 35%, the USAF was over 6% below the interim goal.
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Table 3. The Percentage of Dollars PBSA Actual Compared to the Percentage of Dollars
PBSA Goal for Fiscal Years (FY) 2003 and 2004.
Percentage of Dollars PBSA
Actual
Goal
Difference

FY03
32.27
25
7.27

FY04
28.75
35
(6.25)

The results conclude that the USAF did not meet the FY 2004 goal, and is not meeting
interim PBSA goals. Therefore, null hypothesis #2 is rejected.
These numbers are better illustrated using Figure 1 below. Included in this figure
is the percentage of dollars PBSA from FY 2001 through FY 2004, as well as the 50%
PBSA goal for FY 2005. For the first three years there was a distinct upward trend in the
percentage of actual dollars awarded using PBSA. However, in FY 2004 the trend was
broken and there was a noticeable drop in the actual PBSA percentage.
60
% Dollars PBSA Actual

50
Percentage

% Dollars PBSA Goal
40
30
20
10
0
FY01

FY02

FY03

FY04

FY05

Fiscal Year

Figure 1. The percentage of actual dollars PBSA and the goal for percentage of dollars
PBSA as a function of Fiscal Year.
Further analyzing the data using the summary tables included in Appendices C, D,
E, and F, additional interesting phenomena were discovered. For instance, Figure 2
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shows that during FY 2004, not only did the percentage of PBSA dollars decline, but so
did the cumulative PBSA dollars and cumulative total dollars. Thus, PBSA awards
included a smaller percentage of a smaller total dollars awarded. Although it is uncertain
what caused this phenomenon, it may be associated with the reason for a decrease in the

Dollars

PBSA percentage during FY 2004.
$30,000,000,000
$25,000,000,000
$20,000,000,000
$15,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$5,000,000,000
$0

PBSA Dollars
Total Dollars

FY01

FY02

FY03

FY04

Fiscal Year

Figure 2. PBSA dollars and total dollars as a function of Fiscal Year.

Additionally, when analyzing the data by variable Type of Contract, it is
interesting to note that contracts coded L (Fixed Price Incentive), M (Fixed Price Award
Fee), R (Cost Plus Award Fee), Y (Time and Materials), and Z (Labor Hour) or left
blank, all had a decrease in the percentage of dollars PBSA for FY 2004 (see Figure 3).
The decrease in Cost Plus Award Fee contracts is the most significant because in FY
2004, these types of contracts accounted for over 25% of the total eligible dollars. All the
other contracts that realized a decrease in the percentage of dollars PBSA for FY 2004
each accounted for less than 9% of the total eligible dollars.
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Percentage Dollars PBSA
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Figure 3. Percentage of total dollars PBSA by Type of Contract.
Surprisingly, contracts coded J (Firm Fixed Price) and U (Cost Plus Fixed Fee),
which together account for over 45% of all eligible dollars during FY 2004, both
managed to increase their percentage of dollars PBSA. Unfortunately, these increases
could not overcome the effect of the percentage decreases in the other contract types.
Investigative Question 3. In order to answer investigative question 3, the
following hypotheses were established:
Null hypothesis #3 (Ho3): The USAF will meet the mandated FY 2005 goal of
50% of all eligible service dollars and actions awarded using PBSA.
Alternate hypothesis #3 (Ha3): The USAF will not meet the mandated FY 2005
goal of 50% of all eligible service dollars and actions awarded using PBSA.
Null hypothesis #3a (Ho3a): The FY 2005 % of dollars PBSA ≥ 50%
Alternate hypothesis #3a (Ha3a): The FY 2005 % of dollars PBSA < 50%
Null hypothesis #3b (Ho3b): The FY 2005 % of action PBSA ≥ 50%
Alternate hypothesis #3b (Ha3b): The FY 2005 % of actions PBSA < 50%
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The JMP outputs in Figures 4 and 5 summarize the least squares fit of the linear
regression models to the percentage dollars and actions PBSA.

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.367858
0.051787
2.678479
28.89007
4

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
1
8.349715
8.34971
2
14.348495
7.17425
3
22.698209

F Ratio
1.1638
Prob > F
0.3935

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
FY

Estimate Std Error
25.659414 3.280453
1.2922627 1.197852

t Ratio Prob>|t|
7.82 0.0160
1.08 0.3935

Figure 4. JMP printout of least squares fit to percentage of dollars PBSA.

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.788726
0.683089
3.295191
28.58397
4

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
1
81.07211
81.0721
2
21.71657
10.8583
3
102.78868

F Ratio
7.4664
Prob > F
0.1119

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
FY

Estimate Std Error
18.517191 4.035769
4.0267135 1.473654

t Ratio Prob>|t|
4.59 0.0444
2.73 0.1119

Figure 5. JMP printout of least squares fit to percentage of actions PBSA.
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As expected, neither model was very predictive, as evident by the low F statistic
values and high P-values. The percentage drop for FY 2004 and the use of only four data
points to build these models, both had a negative effect on the establishment of a good
trend line. However, despite the models limitations, they were still used to forecast for
the percentage of dollars and actions PBSA for FY 2005.
Using the calculated intercept and parameter coefficients, the following models
were established:
% Dollars PBSA = 25.6594 + 1.2922 * Year
% Actions PBSA = 18.5172 + 4.0267 * Year
By substituting 5 in for the variable Year, the following forecasted PBSA percentages
were calculated:
% Dollars PBSA = 32.12
% Actions PBSA = 38.65
Figures 6 and 7 provide a better illustration of the linear regression lines plotted with the
actual PBSA percentages.
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Figure 6. The percentage of dollars PBSA and the liner regression line for percentage of
dollars PBSA as a function of Fiscal Year.

% Actions PBSA
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Figure 7. The percentage of actions PBSA and the liner regression line for percentage of
actions PBSA as a function of Fiscal Year.
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Obviously the PBSA percentages for both dollars and actions are well below the
goal of 50%, thus resulting in the rejection of the null hypotheses for both PBSA dollars
and actions.
Assuming the FY 2004 percentages were anomalies, the FY 2004 data points
were removed and new regression models were built. The JMP outputs in Figures 8 and
9 summarize the least squares fit of the linear regression models to the percentage dollars
and actions PBSA, excluding FY 2004.

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.999649
0.999297
0.089255
28.93533
3

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
1
22.665665
22.6657
1
0.007966
0.0080
2
22.673631

F Ratio
2845.16
Prob > F
0.0119

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
FY

Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
22.202473 0.136339 162.85 0.0039
3.3664272 0.063113 53.34 0.0119

Figure 8. JMP printout of least squares fit to percentage of dollars PBSA, excluding FY
2004.
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Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.995859
0.991718
0.59805
27.4144
3

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
F Ratio
1
86.016080
86.0161 240.4945
1
0.357663
0.3577 Prob > F
2
86.373743
0.0410

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
FY

Estimate Std Error
14.298294 0.913536
6.5580515 0.422885

t Ratio Prob>|t|
15.65 0.0406
15.51 0.0410

Figure 9. JMP printout of least squares fit to percentage of actions PBSA, excluding FY
2004.
Removing the data point for FY 2004 significantly increased the reliability of the
models, as evident by the higher F statistic values and lower P-values. Using these
models, the percentage of dollars and actions PBSA for FY 2005 were calculated.
Using the calculated intercept and parameters coefficients, the following models
were established:
% Dollars PBSA = 22.2025 + 3.3664 * Year
% Actions PBSA = 14.2983 + 6.5580 * Year
By substituting 5 in for the variable Year, the following forecasted PBSA percentages
were calculated:
% Dollars PBSA = 39.03
% Actions PBSA = 47.09
Again, the PBSA percentages for both dollars and actions are below the goal of 50%,
thus resulting in the rejection of the null hypotheses for both PBSA dollars and actions.
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A 2-period moving average was also used to forecast for FY 2005 PBSA
percentages. Using this method, the following forecasted percentages for FY 2005 were
calculated:
% Dollars PBSA = 30.51
% Actions PBSA = 32.91
Assuming the FY 2004 percentages were anomalies, the FY 2004 data points
were removed and new percentages were calculated for FY 2004 and 2005 using a 2period moving average. Using this method the following forecasted percentages for FY
2004 and 2005 were calculated:
FY 2004 % Dollars PBSA = 30.64
FY 2004 % Actions PBSA = 30.82
FY 2005 % Dollars PBSA = 30.54
FY 2005 % Actions PBSA = 32.39
The removal of the FY 2004 percentages resulted in only a small change in the
forecasted percentages for FY 2005. Again, the PBSA percentages for both dollars and
actions are below the goal of 50%, thus resulting in the rejection of the null hypotheses
for both PBSA dollars and actions. Table 4 summarizes all forecast results for FY 2005.
Table 4. Summary of Forecast Results.
FY 2005 Forecast
% Actions PBSA % Dollars PBSA
38.65
32.12
47.09
39.03
32.91
30.51
32.39
30.54

Forecasting Method
Linear Regression
Linear Regression (w/out FY 2004)
Moving Average
Moving Average (w/out FY 2004)

All forecasted PBSA percentages for FY 2005, measured in both dollars and actions,
were below the goal of 50% and resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis.
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Investigative Question 4. In order to answer investigative question 4, the
following hypotheses were established:
Null hypothesis #4 (Ho4 dollars): The percentage of modifications, measured in
dollars, coded PBSA is equal to the percentage of non-modifications, measured in
dollars, coded PBSA.
Alternate hypothesis #4 (Ha4 dollars): The percentage of modifications, measured in
dollars, coded PBSA is not equal to the percentage of non-modifications,
measured in dollars, coded PBSA.
Null hypothesis #4 (Ho4 actions): The percentage of modifications, measured in
actions, coded PBSA is equal to the percentage of non-modifications, measured in
actions, coded PBSA.
Alternate hypothesis #4 (Ha4 actions): The percentage of modifications, measured
in actions, coded PBSA is not equal to the percentage of non-modifications,
measured in actions, coded PBSA.
Additionally, the following sub-hypotheses were established in order to assist in
answering investigative question 4:
Null hypothesis #4a (Ho4a 2001dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4a (Ha4a 2001dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4a (Ho4a 2001actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4a (Ha4a 2001actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4b (Ho4b 2002dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4b (Ha4b 2002dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4b (Ho4b 2002actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4b (Ha4b 2002actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4c (Ho4c 2003dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4c (Ha4c 2003dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4c (Ho4c 2003actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4c (Ha4c 2003actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4d (Ho4d 2004dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4d (Ha4d 2004dollars): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
Null hypothesis #4d (Ho4d 2004actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| ≤ 5%
Alternate hypothesis #4d (Ha4d 2004actions): |PBSA Mod %-PBSA Non-mod %| > 5%
A summary of the results broken out for each year in both dollars and actions is displayed
in Tables 5 and 6 below.
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Table 5. The Percentage of Modification Dollars PBSA Compared to the Percentage of
Non-Modification Dollars PBSA for Fiscal Years (FY) 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004.
Percentage of PBSA Dollars
Modifications
Non-Modifications
Difference (Absolute Value)

FY01
25.51
25.56
0.04

FY02
25.60
32.77
7.17

FY03
29.31
34.57
5.26

FY04
22.32
35.08
12.75

Table 6. The Percentage of Modification Actions PBSA Compared to the Percentage of
Non-Modification Actions PBSA for Fiscal Years (FY) 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004.
Percentage of PBSA Actions
Modifications
Non-Modifications
Difference (Absolute Value)

FY01
21.55
20.17
1.39

FY02
27.96
27.88
0.08

FY03
33.61
33.78
0.17

FY04
32.45
31.92
0.54

These calculations are better illustrated using line graphs. Figure 10 shows that
the percentage of modifications coded PBSA, measured in actions, was almost identical
to the percentage of non-modifications coded PBSA. Figure 11 shows that the
percentage of modifications coded PBSA, measured in dollars, was more than 5% less
than the percentage of non-modifications coded PBSA for FYs 2002, 2003, and 2004.
Therefore, the null hypothesis in dollars is rejected, but the null hypothesis in actions
cannot be rejected.
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Figure 10. The percentage of modifications PBSA and percentage of non-modifications
PBSA, measured in actions, as a function of Fiscal Year.
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Figure 11. The percentage of modifications PBSA and percentage of non-modifications
PBSA, measured in dollars, as a function of Fiscal Year.
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Further analysis of the data revealed additional interesting phenomena. Figure 12
illustrates how the dollar amount per PBSA modification has decreased each year, while
the dollar amount per non-PBSA modifications has increased the last three years.
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Figure 12. The dollars per action for all PBSA modifications and non-PBSA
modifications, as a function of Fiscal Year.
Conversely, Figure 13 illustrates how the dollar amount per PBSA nonmodification, which are new PBSA contracts, has been greater than non-PBSA nonmodifications each year.
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Figure 13. The dollars per action for all PBSA non-modifications and non-PBSA nonmodifications, as a function of Fiscal Year.
Investigative Question 5. The following hypotheses were established in order to
answer investigative question 5:
Null hypothesis #6 (Ho6): Classification “x” and PBSA are independent
Alternate hypothesis #6 (Ha6): Classification “x” and PBSA are dependent
Dependency was determined using contingency tables. All classifications, except one,
were found to be dependent, thus supporting the rejection of the null hypothesis. MultiYear Contract was the only classification that yielded a chi-square (χ2) value that was
smaller than chi-square alpha (χ2α), thus not falling in the rejection region. Again, it is
important to note that contingency tables were unable to determine dependency for some
classifications because expected cell counts were less than 1. These classifications
included FSC or SVC Code, NAICS Code, and Authority for Other than Full and Open
Competition. Table 7 summarizes the results from the contingency table analysis.
Printouts of all the contingency tables can be found in Appendix G.
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Table 7. Summary of Contingency Tables
Classification
B1C – Bundled Contract
B1D – Bundled Contract Exception
B10 – Multi-Year Contract
B13A – Contract/Order
B13B – Type of Indefinite-Delivery
Contract
B13E – Multiple Award Contract Fair
Opportunity
B13F – Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use
C1 - Synopsis
C2 – Reason Not Synopsized
C3 – Extent Competed
C5 – Type of Contract
C8 – Solicitation Procedures
C14 – Commercial Items
D1A – Type of Entity
D1B – Women-Owned Business
D1C – HUBZone Representation
D1D – Ethnic Group
D4A – Type of Set-Aside
D4B – Type of Preference
D7 – SBIR Program

χ2

χ2α

df

124.58
230.56
0.07
1790.86

6.64
11.34
6.63
18.48

122.42

1
3
1
7

Prob>
χ2
<.0001
<.0001
.7877
0.0000

Results
Dependent
Dependent
Independent
Dependent

11.34

3

<.0001

Dependent

10017.72

15.09

5

0.0000

Dependent

2112.51
1479.44
603.47
796.09
4549.71
3405.04
2816.34
2334.19
1089.73
563.87
397.33
1304.75
1066.71
1275.33

13.28
11.34
13.28
13.28
26.22
21.67
9.21
24.73
11.34
9.21
18.48
20.09
11.34
13.28

4
3
4
4
12
9
2
11
3
2
7
8
3
4

0.0000
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent

For single response variables, such as Bundled Contract, a result of “Dependent”
means that there is dependence between the variable being coded “Yes” or “No” and
PBSA being coded “Yes” or “No.” For multi-response variables, such as Contract/Order,
a result of “Dependent” means that there is dependence between the variable’s possible
responses and PBSA being coded “Yes” or “No.” However, contingency tables only
determine dependency between two classifications, not the extent of the relationship.
Because of this, contingency tables were used to help narrow down the classifications
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used for logistic regression. Unfortunately, only one classification, Multi-Year Contract,
was independent, thus excluded from further analysis.
Logistic regression was also used to answer investigative question 5. The
following hypotheses were established:
Null hypothesis #5 (Ho5): The parameter for variable “x” equals zero.
Alternate hypothesis #5 (Ha5): The parameter for variable “x” does not equal
zero.
As depicted in Table 8, logistic regression yielded the same χ2 values calculated
using contingency tables. This was expected because the logistic regression models were
built using only one independent variable and a dependent variable, PBSA. This is
similar to contingency tables, which test the dependency between only two variables.
Based on the χ2 and associated P-values, the null hypotheses for all variables, except
Obligated or Deobligated Dollars, are rejected. The null hypothesis for Obligated or
Deobligated Dollars is not rejected, because the P-value of .9928 is clearly larger than the
significance level of .01.
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Table 8. Summary of Logistic Regression
Variable
B1C – Bundled Contract
B8 - Obligated or Deobligated Dollars
B13A – Contract/Order
B13B – Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract
B13E – Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity
B13F – Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use
C1 - Synopsis
C3 – Extent Competed
C5 – Type of Contract
C14 – Commercial Items
D1B – Women-Owned Business
D1C – HUBZone Representation
D1D – Ethnic Group
D4A – Type of Set-Aside
D4B – Type of Preference
D7 – SBIR Program

χ2
124.58
.000081
1790.86
122.42
10017.72
212.51
1479.44
796.09
4549.71
28.16
1089.73
563.87
397.33
1304.75
1066.71
1275.33

Prob> χ2
<.0001
0.9928
0.0000
<.0001
0.0000
0.0000
<.0001
<.0001
0.0000
0.0000
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

R2 (U)
0.0013
0.0000
0.0193
0.0013
0.1081
0.0228
0.0160
0.0086
0.0491
0.0304
0.0118
0.0061
0.0043
0.0141
0.0115
0.0138

In addition to χ2 and associated P-values, logistic regression also calculated R2
(U) values for each variable. As shown in Table 8, the highest R2 (U) value obtained was
.1081 for Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity, which also yielded the highest χ2
value using contingency tables. The lowest R2 (U) value obtained was .0000 for
Obligated or Deobligated Dollars. This means that the single variable model with the
most explanatory power is the model that includes the variable Multiple Award Contract
Fair Opportunity and the single variable model with the least explanatory power is the
model that includes the variable Obligated or Deobligated Dollars. It is important to note
that some of the variable responses were classified as unstable, meaning that a regression
model could not be established. Variables that had unstable responses included Bundled
Contract Exception, FSC or SVC Code, NAICS Code, Reason Not Synopsized,
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Solicitation Procedures, Authority for Other than Full and Open Competition, and Type
of Entity.
In an attempt to build a model for prediction of PBSA, the 15 variables classified
as stable in logistic regression were cumulatively tested against the independent variable
PBSA. When using all 15 stable variables, an R2 (U) of .2019 was obtained.
Unfortunately, many of the parameter estimates for the variable responses in the model
were identified as being biased. This indicates that there are one or more linear
dependencies in the design and the linear combination of these factors exactly duplicates
another factor's value (JMP, 2003). These variables included Type of Set-Aside, Type of
Preference, Women-Owned Business, Type of Contract, Extent Competed, Synopsis, and
Contract/Order. Consequently all of these variables were removed from the model. With
both the unstable and biased variables removed from the model an R2 (U) of .1615 was
obtained. Table 9 summarizes these results.
Table 9. Summary of Logistic Regression Model
Variable
Model w/out Unstable or Biased Variables

χ2
15425.8

Prob> χ2
0.0000

R2 (U)
0.1615

This model includes a total of 7 independent variables. The parameter estimates for the
variable responses included in this model can be found in Appendix H. The Wald
statistic χ2 value was used to test the significance of the model. The χ2 value and
associated P-value support the rejection of the null hypothesis that the parameter
estimates are equal to zero.
Separate regressions were also run for each independent variable against the
dependent variable, PBSA. Parameter estimates for each variable response were
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calculated using logistic regression and tested using the null and alternate hypotheses.
The probability of PBSA for each response was calculated by substituting the parameter
estimate and intercept values into the logistic regression formula. These results are
displayed in Tables 10 through 25.
Table 10. Summary of Bundled Contract Response Parameter Estimates and Probability
of PBSA
Prob
Standard
Prob>χ2
Response
Estimate
χ2
PBSA
Error
Intercept
-0.1058595
0.0729567
2.11
0.1468
Bundled Contract [N]
-0.784822
0.0729567
115.72
<.0001 0.2909
Table 11. Summary of Obligated or Deobligated Dollars Parameter Estimates and
Probability of PBSA
Standard
Prob
Response
Estimate
χ2
Prob>χ2
Error
PBSA
Intercept
-0.8857118
0.0080113
12223
0.0000
Obligated or
2.92E-7.626e-12
8.454e-10
0.00
0.9928
Deobligated Dollars
01
Table 12. Summary of Contract/Order Response Parameter Estimates and Probability of
PBSA
Standard
Prob
Response
Estimate
χ2
Prob>χ2
Error
PBSA
Intercept
-0.998353
0.0358911
773.74
<.0001
Contract/Order [1]
-0.7217959
0.1237749
34.01
<.0001
0.1518
Contract/Order [3]
-0.2074712
0.0380209
29.78
<.0001
0.2304
Contract/Order [4]
-0.9436227
0.0952635
98.12
<.0001
0.1254
Contract/Order [5]
0.18104332
0.0371747
23.72
<.0001
0.3063
Contract/Order [6]
0.79224635
0.0405313
382.07
<.0001
0.4486
Contract/Order [7]
-0.0414182
0.1740474
0.06
0.8119
0.2611
Contract/Order [8]
1.10775159
0.0975163
129.04
<.0001
0.5273
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Table 13. Summary of Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract Response Parameter
Estimates and Probability of PBSA
Standard
Response
Estimate
χ2
Prob>χ2
Error
Intercept
-1.0211204
0.0219221
2169.6
0.0000
Type of Indefinite0.07728689
0.0275839
7.85
0.0051
Delivery Contract [A]
Type of Indefinite0.22509695
0.023591
91.04
<.0001
Delivery Contract [B]
Type of Indefinite-0.3855376
0.0624557
38.11
<.0001
Delivery Contract [C]

Prob
PBSA
0.2801
0.3108
0.1967

Table 14. Summary of Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity Response Parameter
Estimates and Probability of PBSA
Standard
Prob
Response
Estimate
χ2
Prob>χ2
Error
PBSA
Intercept
-0.090934
0.0655989
1.92
0.1657
Multiple Award Contract
-1.474946
0.0720001 419.65 <.0001 0.1728
Fair Opportunity [A]
Multiple Award Contract
-0.3685983
0.3081339
1.43
<.0001 0.3870
Fair Opportunity [B]
Multiple Award Contract
-0.7424187
0.0658268
60.02
<.0001 0.3029
Fair Opportunity [C]
Multiple Award Contract
0.33541685
0.0849517
15.59
<.0001 0.5608
Fair Opportunity [D]
Multiple Award Contract
3.23880086
0.0906054 1277.8 <.0001 0.9588
Fair Opportunity [E]
Table 15. Summary of Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use Response Parameter Estimates
and Probability of PBSA
Standard
Prob
Prob>χ2
Response
Estimate
χ2
Error
PBSA
Intercept
-0.6769128
0.0327053
428.38
<.0001
Indefinite-Delivery
0.13168575
0.0836275
2.48
0.1153
0.3669
Contract Use [A]
Indefinite-Delivery
-0.4508388
0.0864576
27.19
<.0001
0.2445
Contract Use [B]
Indefinite-Delivery
0.06102411
0.0671189
0.83
0.3632
0.3507
Contract Use [C]
Indefinite-Delivery
0.62824516
0.036076
303.26
<.0001
0.4878
Contract Use [D]
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Table 16. Summary of Synopsis Response Parameter Estimates and Probability of PBSA
Prob
Standard
Prob>χ2
Response
Estimate
χ2
PBSA
Error
Intercept
-0.8755429
0.0112263
6080.5
0.0000
Synopsis [A]
0.0127636
0.0133898
0.91
0.3405
0.2967
Synopsis [B]
-0.2978881
0.0262107
129.17
<.0001
0.2362
Synopsis [N]
-0.3812092
0.0168928
509.24
<.0001
0.2215
Table 17. Summary of Extent Competed Response Parameter Estimates and Probability
of PBSA
Standard
Prob
Response
Estimate
χ2
Prob>χ2
Error
PBSA
Intercept
-1.1004947
0.0540626
414.36
<.0001
Extent Competed [A]
0.31589528
0.0544904
33.61
<.0001
0.3133
Extent Competed [B]
0.07087583
0.0582072
1.48
0.2234
0.2631
Extent Competed [C]
-0.4739783
0.0757671
39.13
<.0001
0.1715
Extent Competed [D]
-0.3875817
0.0582598
44.26
<.0001
0.1842
Table 18. Summary of Type of Contract Response Parameter Estimates and Probability
of PBSA
Standard
Prob
Response
Estimate
χ2
Prob>χ2
Error
PBSA
Intercept
-1.0594573
0.0427791
613.34
<.0001
Type of Contract [A]
-0.8376623
0.4049809
4.28
0.0386
0.1304
Type of Contract [J]
0.3953269
0.0440563
80.52
<.0001
0.3398
Type of Contract [K]
0.83916138
0.0951713
77.75
<.0001
0.4451
Type of Contract [L]
-0.0684458
0.0946795
0.52
0.4697
0.2445
Type of Contract [M]
0.91469634
0.0821388
124.01
<.0001
0.4638
Type of Contract [R]
0.33138718
0.0501084
43.74
<.0001
0.3256
Type of Contract [S]
-0.8601807
0.0717832
143.59
<.0001
0.1279
Type of Contract [T]
-1.3640221
0.2600419
27.51
<.0001
0.0813
Type of Contract [U]
-0.922947
0.0485074
362.02
<.0001
0.1210
Type of Contract [V]
0.4370051
0.0771864
32.05
<.0001
0.3492
Type of Contract [Y]
-0.1065667
0.0497674
4.59
<.0001
0.2375
Type of Contract [Z]
0.39199958
0.0804276
23.76
<.0001
0.3390
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Table 19. Summary of Commercial Items Response Parameter Estimates and Probability
of PBSA
Prob
Standard
Response
Estimate
χ2
Prob>χ2
PBSA
Error
Intercept
-0.4863992
0.0107112
2062.1
0.0000
Commercial Items [N]
-0.6438603
0.0120437
2858
0.0000 0.2441
Commercial Items [Y]
0.39160175
0.016669
551.91
<.0001 0.4763
Table 20. Summary of Women-Owned Business Response Parameter Estimates and
Probability of PBSA
Standard
Prob
Response
Estimate
χ2
Prob>χ2
Error
PBSA
Intercept
-0.714826
0.0198109
1301.9
<.0001
Women-Owned
-0.2731451
0.0207879
172.65
<.0001 0.2713
Business [N]
Women-Owned
0.05253677
0.0498592
1.11
0.2920 0.3402
Business [U]
Women-Owned
-0.2850085
0.034124
69.76
<.0001 0.2689
Business [Y]
Table 21. Summary of HUBZone Representation Response Parameter Estimates and
Probability of PBSA
Standard
Prob>
Prob
Response
Estimate
χ2
Error
χ2
PBSA
Intercept
-1.111624 0.0182761 3699.6 0.0000
HUBZone Representation [N]
-0.029883 0.0203999
2.15
0.1430 0.2420
HUBZone Representation [Y]
-0.317349 0.0349925 82.25 <.0001 0.1932
Table 22. Summary of Ethnic Group Response Parameter Estimates and Probability of
PBSA
Prob
Standard
Prob>χ2
Response
Estimate
χ2
PBSA
Error
Intercept
-1.1986828
0.0246557
2363.6
0.0000
Ethnic Group [A]
-0.0632047
0.0971424
0.42
0.5153 0.2206
Ethnic Group [B]
0.31302413
0.0597238
27.47
<.0001 0.2920
Ethnic Group [C]
0.21764375
0.0483839
20.23
<.0001 0.2726
Ethnic Group [D]
-0.2523166
0.0520292
23.52
<.0001 0.1898
Ethnic Group [E]
-0.1670177
0.045031
13.76
0.0002 0.2033
Ethnic Group [F]
-0.3618537
0.0961776
14.16
0.0002 0.1735
Ethnic Group [Z]
-0.0550928
0.0636474
0.75
0.3867 0.2220
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Table 23. Summary of Type of Set-Aside Response Parameter Estimates and Probability
of PBSA
Prob
Standard
Response
Estimate
χ2
Prob>χ2
PBSA
Error
Intercept
-1.1581767
0.050894
517.87
<.0001
Type of Set-Aside [A]
0.19917358
0.0516292
14.88
0.0001 0.2770
Type of Set-Aside [B]
0.36304191
0.0553928
42.95
<.0001 0.3110
Type of Set-Aside [C]
-0.210333
0.1277981
2.71
0.0998 0.2028
Type of Set-Aside [D]
-0.1492011
0.0564274
6.99
0.0082 0.2129
Type of Set-Aside [E]
-0.1824305
0.1418217
1.65
0.1983 0.2074
Type of Set-Aside [F]
-0.6467775
0.2793333
5.36
0.0206 0.1412
Type of Set-Aside [K]
-0.0391031
0.1176526
0.11
0.7396 0.2319
Type of Set-Aside [L]
-0.2833379
0.2151878
1.73
0.1879 0.1913
Table 24. Summary of Type of Preference Response Parameter Estimates and Probability
of PBSA
Standard
Prob
Response
Estimate
χ2
Prob>χ2
Error
PBSA
Intercept
-0.9750136
0.3291877
8.77
0.0031
Type of Preference [A]
-0.0079431
0.329244
0.00
0.9808 0.2723
Type of Preference [B]
-0.1235974
0.8803583
0.02
0.8883 0.2500
Type of Preference [D]
-0.634264
0.5552866
1.30
0.2534 0.1666
Table 25. Summary of SBIR Program Response Parameter Estimates and Probability of
PBSA
Prob
Response
Estimate
Standard Error
χ2
Prob>χ2
PBSA
Intercept
-1.3166613
0.0930408
200.26
<.0001
SBIR Program [A]
0.35851964
0.0932893
14.77
0.0001 0.2772
SBIR Program [B]
-0.4535634
0.3104716
2.13
0.1440 0.1455
SBIR Program [C]
-0.3433492
0.1012258
11.51
0.0007 0.1597
SBIR Program [D]
-0.6444348
0.2210532
8.50
0.0036 0.1233
The null hypothesis is rejected for all responses with P-values < .01. This means
that the selection of these particular responses do not change the probability of an action
being PBSA. For all other responses, where the null hypothesis was rejected, a positive
parameter estimate value signifies an increase in the probability of an action being PBSA
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when that particular response is chosen. A negative value signifies a decrease in the
probability of an action being PBSA. A majority of the parameter estimates were
negative. When a response parameter estimate added with its corresponding intercept
parameter estimate, resulted in a positive value, the probability of that action being PBSA
was greater than .5. Conversely, when a response parameter estimate added with its
corresponding intercept parameter estimate, resulted in a negative value, the probability
of that action being PBSA was less than .5.
By far, the most positively influential response variable is Multiple Award
Contract Fair Opportunity response “E” with a parameter estimate of 3.2388 and a
probability of PBSA of .9588. This means when response “E” is selected, the probability
of that action being PBSA is almost 96%. Response “E” is Minimum Guarantee and is
coded when it was necessary to place an order to satisfy a minimum amount guaranteed
to the contractor. The next most positively influential response variable is
Contract/Order response “8” with a parameter estimate of 1.1078 and probability of
PBSA of .5273. This means when response “8” is selected, the probability of that action
being PBSA is over 52%. Response “8” is Order from Procurement List and is entered
when the contracting action is an action placed with Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR)
or a JWOD Participating Nonprofit Agency.
The most negatively influential response variable is Type of Contract response
“T,” with parameter estimate of -1.36402 and a probability of PBSA of .0813. This
means when response “T” is selected, the probability of that action being PBSA is 8.13%.
Response “T” is the designation for a Cost-Sharing contract The next most negatively
influential response variable is Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity response “A”
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with a parameter estimate of -1.4749 and a probability of PBSA of .17228. This means
when response “A” is selected, the probability of that action being PBSA is 17.23%.
Response “A” is Fair Opportunity Process and is entered when the delivery or task order
was issued pursuant to a process that permitted each contract awardee a fair opportunity
to be considered.

Summary
This chapter presented and discussed the research results. A sample of PBSA
contracts taken from three contracting offices were found to be consistent with the
minimum criteria identified in the PBSA Guidebook, suggesting that there may not be a
systematic problem with PBSA coding. Using descriptive statistics, it was concluded that
the USAF is not meeting interim PBSA goals and the percentage of modification dollars
coded PBSA is not equal to the percentage of non-modification dollars coded PBSA.
Additionally, forecasting suggested that the USAF will not meet the FY 2005 goal of
50% of all actions and dollars PBSA. Lastly, contingency tables and logistic regression
identified dependent variables and variable responses that increase and decrease the
probability of an action being PBSA. Chapter 5 will discuss the conclusions and
recommendations stemming from these results, address the limitations of the study, and
make suggestions for future research.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction
The purpose of this study was to evaluate and analyze the current and expected
future states of Performance Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) implementation in the
United States Air Force (USAF) in order to assist USAF leadership in making PBSA
implementation decisions. This chapter outlines the conclusions drawn from the results
of this study and offers recommendations for PBSA implementation improvements. Also
included in this chapter are the limitations of the study and suggestions for future
research.

Conclusions and Recommendations
A total of five investigative questions were established in order to answer and
address the over arching research question of, “What are the current and expected future
states of PBSA implementation in the USAF?”
Conclusions - Investigative Question 1. Is the J001 database, which is the source
of government procurement data, reliable? The answer to this question is still unknown.
However, this research concludes that the coding of PBSA contracts for the 88 ABW/PK,
AFRL Det 1/PK, and ASC/PK is reliable and consistent with the minimum mandatory
criteria identified in The Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisitions in the
Department of Defense (PBSA Guidebook). While this determination of reliability
cannot be generalized statistically to the entire J001 database, it does indicate that there
may not be systematic problems with PBSA coding. For PBSA coding, these results are
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contrary to past GAO findings that suggest federal procurement data is unreliable
(Woods, 2003). Additionally, the results imply that the J001 database may not be as
inaccurate as initially reported.
Recommendations – Investigative Question 1. Because the results suggest that
there may not be a systematic problem with PBSA coding in the J001 database, it is
recommended that the USAF increase utilization of the J001 database for PBSA
performance tracking. Many organizations rely on self-reports from other agencies when
compiling PBSA metrics. From the researcher’s personal experience, these self-reports,
many times, differ from what was actually coded on the DD Form 350. In addition, this
self-reports take time and money to generate. Utilizing the J001 database may ultimately
be the most accurate and efficient means of measuring PBSA performance and should be
used to the maximum extent practicable.
Conclusions - Investigative Question 2. Is the USAF meeting interim PBSA
goals? The answer to this question is no. The USAF was on track and had met all
interim PBSA goals established by the acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Mr. Michael Wynne, through FY 2003. This was
large in part due to the fact that goals were set low and were easily attainable. However,
in FY 2004 the percentage of dollars awarded using PBSA significantly dropped and was
well below the FY 2004 goal of 35 percent.
The decrease in PBSA percentages implies several possible alternatives. First, the
decrease implies that the emphasis on PBSA in waning. Now in its fourth year, PBSA
implementation may not be as much of as hot topic as it was upon initial start-up.
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Conversely, the decrease in PBSA percentages may imply that there has been an
increase in education, training, and awareness of PBSA techniques and application and
contracting personnel are better at determining which contracts should use PBSA. Of the
3 incorrectly coded PBSA contracts sampled in this study, 2 of them were awarded
during the first 2 years of PBSA implementation. This suggests that PBSA coding may
be becoming more accurate as years progress. As PBSA coding becomes more accurate,
fewer incorrectly coded contracts may be contributing to PBSA percentages. The
decrease in PBSA percentages during FY 2004 may not be as significant due to the fact
that the percentages during the previous years may have been over inflated with
incorrectly coded PBSA contracts.
Lastly, the decrease in PBSA percentages may imply that the USAF has hit a
natural plateau in PBSA. The literature shows no rationale for establishment of the
interim PBSA goals, other than progression towards the FY 2005 goal of 50%. The
commercial sector emphasizes PBSA very little due to the small percentage of dollars
attributed to the procurement of services (Barry, 2003). Maybe it is impractical to expect
PBSA percentages greater than 35%. The results show that achieving 20% to 30% PBSA
for both actions and dollars is possible. However, at what point are services that may not
be suitable for PBSA being forced into PBSA methods for the sake of meeting mandated
goals? Because of this, the question that surfaces is, “Were these goals reasonable and
attainable to begin with?” This research suggests that they weren’t.
Recommendations – Investigative Question 2. It is recommended that the USAF
leadership reinvigorate the emphasis on the use of PBSA. This can be done by simply
increasing PBSA communication up and down the chain of command. While there are
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endless methods to communicate the emphasis, leadership could significantly increase
organizational awareness of PBSA by continually posting current PBSA percentages and
PBSA percentage goals for each organization or agency.
It is also recommended that USAF leadership revaluate PBSA goals. Instead of
establishing blanket percentage goals for all services actions, percentages should be
established only for contract characteristics representing a large percentage of the total
dollars or actions and a high probability of being PBSA. For instance, it may not be as
important to reach a goal of 50% of all PBSA dollars for Cost Plus Incentive Fee
contracts when these type of contracts accounted for less than 2% of the total dollars for
FY 2004 and are seldom used with PBSA. However, it may be important to focus on the
percentage of PBSA dollars for Firm Fixed Price contracts since they accounted for the
largest percentage of total dollars for FY 2004, at over 36%, and, when compared to other
responses, have a relatively high probability of PBSA at 33%. This will lead to focused
PBSA efforts directed at areas that make the most sense for PBSA use and are the most
fiscally influential. While this may not lead to the achievement of 50% of all actions and
dollars PBSA, it can lead to the maximizing of PBSA efforts in the areas that represent
the largest percentage of total dollars.
Conclusions - Investigative Question 3. Is the USAF on track to meet future
mandated PBSA goals? The answer to this question is no. Even though there were only
four data points, several forecasting methods were used. Using liner regression and
moving averages, forecasts of the percentage actions and dollars PBSA for FY 2005 were
calculated. All forecasts indicate that the USAF will fall well short of the 50% PBSA
goal for FY 2005. Although the forecasting models used were questionable, the
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graphical evidence illustrates a trend line falling well short of 50% for FY 2005. There
was clearly an upward trend in the percentages of PBSA prior to FY 2004, possibly
meaning that the decrease in FY 2004 was an anomaly and an upward trend may resume
for FY 2005. However, in order to make a truly reliable forecast more data points would
need to be included in the models.
These results support Lacey’s (2004) suspicion that the USAF will not meet the
FY 2005 goal of 50% PBSA. Similarly to the conclusions for investigative question 2,
the results imply that the goal may not have been reasonable or attainable to begin with
and that the USAF may have hit a natural plateau in PBSA.
Recommendations - Investigative Question 3. Similar to investigative question 1,
it is recommended that USAF leadership reinvigorate the emphasis on PBSA use and
revaluate PBSA goals.
Conclusions - Investigative Question 4. Is the percentage of modifications coded
PBSA equal to the percentage of non-modifications coded PBSA? The answer to this
question is no. While the number of actions is relatively equal, the percentage of dollars
PBSA for modifications is significantly smaller than the percentage of dollars PBSA for
non-modifications. Additionally, the cost per PBSA modification has decreased each
year and been less than the cost per non-PBSA modifications every year. Conversely, the
cost per PBSA non-modification has been greater than the cost per non-PBSA nonmodification. These results imply that new PBSA contracts, on average, cost more than
non-PBSA contracts, but result in modifications that, on average, cost less than nonPBSA modifications.
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Recommendations - Investigative Question 4. It is recommended that, when
deciding whether to award a contract using PBSA techniques, contracting personnel take
into consideration that future modifications to PBSA contracts may cost less than nonPBSA contracts. With less money being spent on modifications to PBSA contracts, a
large percentage of future funds can be used to fund the procurement of new services or
supplies.
Conclusions - Investigative Question 5. Are any particular acquisition
characteristics associated with PBSA use? The answer to this question is yes.
Contingency tables clearly indicated that there are numerous contract characteristics that
are dependent with PBSA, confirming Lacey’s (2004) ascertains. However, contingency
tables are unable to determine the extent of the dependencies.
Logistic Regression was able to identify which variable responses are significant
and whether they increase or decrease the probability of an action being PBSA.
Numerous variables were found to be significant, but very few of the variable responses
increased the probability of an action being PBSA above 50 percent.
These results imply that PBSA is a complex type of contract that can be used in
various types of contracting circumstances. Predicting when to use PBSA can not easily
be done by knowing one, two, or even “x” corresponding variables. The use of PBSA
should not be eliminated as a possibility simply because a certain variable response is
selected. While some responses may increase, such as Multiple Award Contract Fair
Opportunity response “E,” or decrease the probability of PBSA, such as Type of Contract
response “T,” none guarantee or completely eliminate the possibility of PBSA use.
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Recommendations - Investigative Question 5. It is recommended that contracting
personnel look at all variables surrounding an acquisition when determining whether to
use PBSA techniques. The use of PBSA should not be dependent on the selection of a
single variable response. The results of this study show that there are numerous
dependencies and correlations between contract characteristics and PBSA. PBSA
determination based on a single response should be avoided.

Study Limitations
Just like any research, there are some limitations to this study. Factors that
contributed to these shortcomings included funding limitations, time constraints, and
practicality.
The first limitation to this research is the reliability of the J001 database.
Although a sample of PBSA contracts was taken and evaluated against the minimum
mandatory PBSA criteria, it did not represent PBSA contracts throughout the USAF, only
the three offices from which it was taken. Therefore, the reliability of the J001 database
across the USAF is still unknown. An effort was made to select different types of
contracting offices, which work with different types of services contracts. However, the
sample was unable to account for every demographic in USAF contracting. Additionally,
while the results yielded from this sample were satisfactory, the results from a sample
taken from the entire USAF may significantly differ, thus yielding a contradictory
determination of the reliability of the J001 database.
The second limitation of this study is the fact that when evaluating the sampled
contracts against the minimum mandatory PBSA criteria, the quality of the PBSA service
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contracts was not taken into account. For instance, a PBSA service contract that
contained well thought-out, specific, and easily measured performance evaluation
measurements was considered the same as a contract that met the bare minimum
requirements for PBSA classification. Because of this, it is not known if better quality
PBSA contracts differ from minimum quality PBSA contracts, and thus yield different
results.
Another limitation of the study is the use of forecasting methods to forecast FY
2005 percentages. Because there was only four years of data to build a predictive model,
the linear regression and 2-period moving average models established and used to
forecast were not optimal. Significance of the models was limited, but they did provide
an illustration of the general trend of the data.

Future Research
With so little research conducted in this field and still so many questions to be
answered, the prospects for future research are plentiful. Some of these research ideas
stem from questions that surfaced from the results of this study, while some are simply
questions that have yet to be answered.
The first opportunity for future research is to confirm this study’s results that the
J001 database is truly reliable, not only for the PBSA contracts at the three contracting
offices sampled at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, but for all contracts across the entire
USAF. This could be done by taking a sample of PBSA coded contracts from the entire
pool of PBSA contracts and evaluating them against the minimum mandatory PBSA
criteria, similarly to the way in which investigative question 1 in this study was answered.
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Careful stratification of the sample would need to be taken in order to ensure all USAF
demographics were properly represented. Not until this type of sample is evaluated and
tested, will USAF leadership truly know the reliability of PBSA coding in the J001
database.
The next opportunity for future research would be to further the logistic
regression analysis performed in this study by building a comprehensive model for
prediction of PBSA using contracts variable responses. It was apparent during this study
that there are numerous variables that are dependent with PBSA. Using this study’s
results as a foundation, the research could solidify which variable responses, if any, when
combined, significantly increase the probability of a contracting action being PBSA.
This could be done by using other functional forms or combinations of variables. The
establishment of a predictive model may lead to underlying relationships with PBSA that
are transparent on the surface. However, any model would have to be evaluated for
practical significance in order to provide any benefit to contracting personnel.
The next possible research effort would be to evaluate what is causing the
fluctuation in PBSA percentages for different contract types from year to year. The
results from this study clearly show significant changes in PBSA percentages for
particular contract variables, such as Type of Contract, from year to year. Why these
changes are occurring and what is causing them is unknown. Some of these fluctuations
may be insignificant because of the small percentage of the total dollars or actions the
response may represent, and not be worth investigation. Investigating the fluctuation of
variable responses that account for a large percentage of the total dollars may reveal the
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true cause of the decline in PBSA percentages in FY 2004 and lead to the true driver of
PBSA use.
The next opportunity for future research would be to study the relationship
between service codes and PBSA use. By identifying which individual service codes
increase and decrease the probability of PBSA and account for the largest percentage of
total dollars and/or actions, USAF leadership could gain a better understanding of what
services do and do not facilitate the use of PBSA techniques. Using this information,
focused PBSA goals for individual service codes could be established.
Another possible area of study would be the evaluation of cost savings associated
with use of PBSA. Of course, studies (OFPP, 1998) have concluded there are benefits
are associated with PBSA use. However, no recent studies have shown how much the
USAF is saving, if any, by implementing and using PBSA. If the USAF is not saving any
money or gaining any quality by implementing and using PBSA, why spend the time and
resources on PBSA training and the achievement of PBSA goals? Additionally, if the
USAF is achieving cost savings from PBSA, how does quality of the PBSA contracts
affect the savings? This study did not account for quality differences between PBSA
contracts, as all PBSA contracts were deemed to be equal. It would be interesting to
know if better quality PBSA contracts yield more savings and/or better results than PBSA
contracts that only meet the minimum PBSA criteria.

Conclusion
The USAF has made tremendous strides in the implementation of PBSA.
However, it is still falling short of interim goals and will most likely fall short of the
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mandated FY 2005 goal. However, the question of whether these goals were reasonable
or attainable still remains unanswered. Since the USAF has no equal in the commercial
sector for comparison, it is impossible to know if such goals are reachable or if the
USAF has hit a natural plateau in PBSA use never experienced by any other organization.
Instead of trying to convert everything to PBSA, USAF leadership should focus on
maximizing PBSA in areas that are practical and fiscally influential to the overall
percentage of total dollars, such as Firm Fixed Price type contracts. While this may
result in an overall percentage of PBSA less than 50%, it will lead to more efficient use
of personnel and resources.
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Appendix A: Service Code Categories
B. Special Studies & Analysis – Not R&D
C. Architect & Engineering Services
D. Automatic Data Processing & Telecommunication Services
E. Purchase of Structures or Facilities
F. Natural Resources & Conservation Services
G. Social Services
H. Quality Control, Testing & Inspection Services
J. Maintenance, Repair & Rebuilding of Equipment
K. Modification of Equipment
L. Technical Representative Services
M. Operation of Government-Owned Facilities
N. Installation of Equipment
P. Salvage Services
Q. Medical Services
R. Professional, Administrative & Management Support Services
S. Utilities & Housekeeping Services
T. Photographic, Mapping, Printing & Publication Services
U. Educational & Training Services
V. Transportation, Travel & Relocation Services
W. Lease or Rental of Equipment
X. Lease or Rental of Facilities
Y. Construction of Structures & Facilities
Z. Maintenance, Repair or Alteration of Real Property
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Appendix B: Summary of Percentage of Actions and Dollars PBSA by Fiscal Year
FY 2001
Total
PBSA
Dollars $19,733,040,849 $5,038,331,141
Actions
15714
3239

% PBSA
25.53%
20.61%

FY 2002
Total
PBSA
Dollars $22,310,837,208 $6,471,973,020
Actions
18500
5162

% PBSA
29.01%
27.90%

FY 2003
Total
PBSA
Dollars $28,511,634,144 $9,199,368,959
Actions
21943
7401

% PBSA
32.27%
33.73%

FY 2004
Total
PBSA
Dollars $26,649,991,736 $7,663,018,554
Actions
20581
6605

% PBSA
28.75%
32.09%
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Appendix C: Summary of Percentage of Actions and Dollars PBSA for Service
Category, Type of Contract, and Type of Entity for Fiscal Year 2001

B12A - Service Category
A
B
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Z
Total

FY 2001
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Dollars
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions
$8,949,600,040
4053 $1,472,290,609
236
16.45% 5.82%
$323,351,090
355
$39,381,294
50
12.18% 14.08%
$810,075,362
1008
$251,945,817
343
31.10% 34.03%
$0
0
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$43,189,084
81
$7,234,215
26
16.75% 32.10%
$22,675,781
22
$127,072
1
0.56%
4.55%
$45,715,319
27
$1,540,286
5
3.37% 18.52%
$0
0
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$1,599,715,391
1734
$227,989,005
269
14.25% 15.51%
$861,485,895
584
$67,917,913
22
7.88%
3.77%
$655,351,291
258
$607,736,150
171
92.73% 66.28%
$595,101,263
311
$322,396,915
170
54.18% 54.66%
$25,612,730
64
$7,022,123
20
27.42% 31.25%
$0
0
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$21,974,678
47
$3,381,878
8
15.39% 17.02%
$14,457,567
31
$2,426,559
9
16.78% 29.03%
$2,883,200,951
2851
$933,254,934
928
32.37% 32.55%
$628,812,172
819
$312,262,807
414
49.66% 50.55%
$50,781,733
81
$9,435,215
19
18.58% 23.46%
$169,087,643
278
$45,850,191
54
27.12% 19.42%
$809,544,498
705
$708,031,511
467
87.46% 66.24%
$72,957,987
61
$15,664,421
19
21.47% 31.15%
$10,870,353
20
$2,442,226
8
22.47% 40.00%
$1,139,480,021
2324
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$19,733,040,849 15714 $5,038,331,141 3239
25.53% 20.61%

C5 - Type of Contract
Blank
A - Firm Fixed Price Redeterm
J - Firm Fixed Price
K - Fixed Price Econ Price Adj
L - Fixed Price Incentive
M - Fixed Price Award Fee
R - Cost Plus Award Fee
S - Cost Contract
T - Cost Sharing
U - Cost Plus Fixed Fee
V - Cost Plus Incentive Fee
Y - Time and Materials
Z - Labor Hour
Total

FY 2001
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Dollars
$911,955,691
1539
$341,675,527
578
37.47% 37.56%
4.62%
$132,953,058
23
$1,099,964
2
0.83%
8.70%
0.67%
$7,121,978,511
7027 $2,342,189,011 1704
32.89% 24.25%
36.09%
$221,571,764
133
$45,583,739
52
20.57% 39.10%
1.12%
$545,378,522
137
$71,840,788
18
13.17% 13.14%
2.76%
$168,635,400
127
$83,696,954
43
49.63% 33.86%
0.85%
$6,382,828,278
1162 $1,775,037,365
278
27.81% 23.92%
32.35%
$613,186,136
400
$3,015,009
11
0.49%
2.75%
3.11%
$21,574,975
50
$575,084
3
2.67%
6.00%
0.11%
$1,916,305,108
3174
$175,533,215
204
9.16%
6.43%
9.71%
$379,635,498
96
$8,770,228
8
2.31%
8.33%
1.92%
$1,135,150,468
1573
$109,080,298
222
9.61% 14.11%
5.75%
$181,887,440
273
$80,233,959
116
44.11% 42.49%
0.92%
$19,733,040,849 15714 $5,038,331,141 3239
25.53% 20.61%
100.00%

D1A - Type of Entity
Blank
A - Small Disadvantaged in U.S.
B - Other Small in U.S.
C - Large in U.S.
D - JWOD Nonprofit Agency
F - Hospital
L - Foreign Concern/Entity
M - Domestic Firm Outside U.S.
T - Historically Black College
U - Minority Institution
V - Other Educational
Z - Other Nonprofit
Total

FY 2001
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Dollars
$911,955,691
1539
$341,675,527
578
37.47% 37.56%
4.62%
$1,269,886,249
2314
$350,000,693
453
27.56% 19.58%
6.44%
$1,635,130,149
2768
$239,884,021
392
14.67% 14.16%
8.29%
$13,751,598,800 7404 $3,448,422,796 1429
25.08% 19.30%
69.69%
$121,546,408
179
$38,409,844
67
31.60% 37.43%
0.62%
$575,590
2
$575,590
2
100.00% 100.00%
0.00%
$433,639,071
670
$100,734,073
153
23.23% 22.84%
2.20%
$384,562,295
240
$113,036,133
122
29.39% 50.83%
1.95%
$898,356
6
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
$5,054,257
16
$447,997
2
8.86% 12.50%
0.03%
$167,561,977
379
$3,143,090
11
1.88%
2.90%
0.85%
$1,050,632,006
197
$402,001,377
30
38.26% 15.23%
5.32%
$19,733,040,849 15714 $5,038,331,141 3239
25.53% 20.61%
100.00%
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% Dollars of Total
45.35%
1.64%
4.11%
0.00%
0.22%
0.11%
0.23%
0.00%
8.11%
4.37%
3.32%
3.02%
0.13%
0.00%
0.11%
0.07%
14.61%
3.19%
0.26%
0.86%
4.10%
0.37%
0.06%
5.77%
100.00%

Appendix D: Summary of Percentage of Actions and Dollars PBSA for Service
Category, Type of Contract, and Type of Entity for Fiscal Year 2002

B12A - Service Category
A
B
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Z
Total

FY 2002
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Dollars
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions
$9,384,582,101
4833
$911,685,245
279
9.71%
5.77%
$493,684,925
463
$65,451,003
85
13.26% 18.36%
$863,411,994
1181
$404,155,906
543
46.81% 45.98%
$9,069,698
9
$3,030,064
6
0.00%
0.00%
$84,659,024
135
$18,042,034
27
21.31% 20.00%
$15,761,156
24
$543,637
3
3.45% 12.50%
$49,354,140
28
$5,992,026
12
12.14% 42.86%
$0
0
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$1,842,423,172
2065
$454,181,233
490
24.65% 23.73%
$408,947,473
300
$46,903,111
34
11.47% 11.33%
$901,123,782
240
$574,938,293
181
63.80% 75.42%
$682,583,799
391
$483,219,157
268
70.79% 68.54%
$34,621,212
84
$10,683,024
23
30.86% 27.38%
$0
0
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$19,886,640
41
$2,309,136
6
11.61% 14.63%
$17,871,097
44
$7,323,191
28
40.98% 63.64%
$3,561,532,312
3391 $1,330,224,061 1368
37.35% 40.34%
$856,956,221
976
$513,004,856
591
59.86% 60.55%
$43,995,336
84
$22,218,156
41
50.50% 48.81%
$236,157,686
336
$98,147,150
107
41.56% 31.85%
$1,569,942,101
1288 $1,487,411,634 1026
94.74% 79.66%
$83,375,503
75
$25,179,471
32
30.20% 42.67%
$10,902,510
20
$7,330,632
12
67.24% 60.00%
$1,139,995,326
2492
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$22,310,837,208 18500 $6,471,973,020 5162
29.01% 27.90%

C5 - Type of Contract
Blank
A - Firm Fixed Price Redeterm
J - Firm Fixed Price
K - Fixed Price Econ Price Adj
L - Fixed Price Incentive
M - Fixed Price Award Fee
R - Cost Plus Award Fee
S - Cost Contract
T - Cost Sharing
U - Cost Plus Fixed Fee
V - Cost Plus Incentive Fee
Y - Time and Materials
Z - Labor Hour
Total

FY 2002
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Dollars
$1,084,860,282
1947
$498,603,796
867
45.96% 44.53%
4.86%
$57,239,870
15
$1,754,112
3
3.06% 20.00%
0.26%
$8,730,084,054
8059 $3,125,975,698 2814
35.81% 34.92%
39.13%
$85,923,869
123
$47,077,487
50
54.79% 40.65%
0.39%
$799,491,111
154
$366,573,315
38
45.85% 24.68%
3.58%
$265,178,410
191
$160,831,283
97
60.65% 50.79%
1.19%
$6,287,966,577
1479 $1,634,430,280
461
25.99% 31.17%
28.18%
$651,836,670
449
$22,087,011
21
3.39%
4.68%
2.92%
$24,691,965
51
$197,104
1
0.80%
1.96%
0.11%
$2,289,395,582
3790
$241,046,273
240
10.53% 6.33%
10.26%
$413,727,372
227
$67,516,249
32
16.32% 14.10%
1.85%
$1,465,221,100
1787
$263,380,346
475
17.98% 26.58%
6.57%
$155,220,346
228
$42,500,066
63
27.38% 27.63%
0.70%
$22,310,837,208 18500 $6,471,973,020 5162
29.01% 27.90%
100.00%

D1A - Type of Entity
Blank
A - Small Disadvantaged in U.S.
B - Other Small in U.S.
C - Large in U.S.
D - JWOD Nonprofit Agency
F - Hospital
L - Foreign Concern/Entity
M - Domestic Firm Outside U.S.
T - Historically Black College
U - Minority Institution
V - Other Educational
Z - Other Nonprofit
Total

FY 2002
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Dollars
$1,084,860,282
1947
$498,603,796
867
45.96% 44.53%
4.86%
$1,360,607,365
2682
$425,063,809
661
31.24% 24.65%
6.10%
$1,803,197,694
3127
$528,897,624
753
29.33% 24.08%
8.08%
$15,521,075,218 8709 $4,326,819,042 2264
27.88% 26.00%
69.57%
$152,352,594
205
$77,507,811
111
50.87% 54.15%
0.68%
$499,828
2
$499,828
2
100.00% 100.00%
0.00%
$402,719,220
694
$132,047,363
214
32.79% 30.84%
1.81%
$580,988,101
409
$241,634,219
179
41.59% 43.77%
2.60%
$1,763,791
8
$287,447
1
16.30% 12.50%
0.01%
$17,356,716
33
$274,592
1
1.58%
3.03%
0.08%
$516,808,652
476
$22,292,128
29
4.31%
6.09%
2.32%
$868,607,747
208
$218,045,361
80
25.10% 38.46%
3.89%
$22,310,837,208 18500 $6,471,973,020 5162
29.01% 27.90%
100.00%

104

% Dollars of Total
42.06%
2.21%
3.87%
0.04%
0.38%
0.07%
0.22%
0.00%
8.26%
1.83%
4.04%
3.06%
0.16%
0.00%
0.09%
0.08%
15.96%
3.84%
0.20%
1.06%
7.04%
0.37%
0.05%
5.11%
100.00%

Appendix E: Summary of Percentage of Actions and Dollars PBSA for Service
Category, Type of Contract, and Type of Entity for Fiscal Year 2003

B12A - Service Category
A
B
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Z
Total

FY 2003
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Dollars
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions
$9,575,552,634
4891
$726,215,589
181
7.58%
3.70%
$635,771,064
546
$186,191,421
242
29.29% 44.32%
$1,000,332,031
1398
$512,450,598
683
51.23% 48.86%
$17,874,639
19
$7,076,060
9
0.00%
0.00%
$49,870,022
97
$7,885,775
14
15.81% 14.43%
$18,334,219
23
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$1,801,001,078
54
$16,121,674
21
0.90% 38.89%
$0
0
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$2,492,334,950
2135
$615,362,382
543
24.69% 25.43%
$462,965,382
247
$132,624,877
63
28.65% 25.51%
$956,229,751
269
$673,143,323
185
70.40% 68.77%
$745,981,152
407
$554,254,254
317
74.30% 77.89%
$30,266,779
84
$5,471,967
21
18.08% 25.00%
$0
0
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$17,695,575
39
$10,290,523
17
58.15% 43.59%
$25,675,207
62
$20,859,248
44
81.24% 70.97%
$4,247,421,424
4089 $1,782,642,691 1805
41.97% 44.14%
$1,360,555,553
1133 $1,047,016,864
856
76.96% 75.55%
$45,953,984
82
$12,823,609
25
27.91% 30.49%
$298,889,044
300
$138,853,352
120
46.46% 40.00%
$2,699,981,982
2249 $2,623,676,457 2059
97.17% 91.55%
$45,448,357
104
$28,455,510
51
62.61% 49.04%
$20,448,343
32
$2,024,638
6
9.90% 18.75%
$1,963,050,974
3683
$95,928,147
139
4.89%
3.77%
$28,511,634,144 21943 $7,663,018,554 7401
26.88% 33.73%

C5 - Type of Contract
Blank
A - Firm Fixed Price Redeterm
J - Firm Fixed Price
K - Fixed Price Econ Price Adj
L - Fixed Price Incentive
M - Fixed Price Award Fee
R - Cost Plus Award Fee
S - Cost Contract
T - Cost Sharing
U - Cost Plus Fixed Fee
V - Cost Plus Incentive Fee
Y - Time and Materials
Z - Labor Hour
Total

FY 2003
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Dollars
$1,549,124,081
2527
$759,373,566
1257
49.02% 49.74%
5.43%
$1,282,309
4
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
$10,816,371,305 10277 $4,506,576,657 4268
41.66% 41.53%
37.94%
$105,365,465
137
$64,154,948
67
60.89% 48.91%
0.37%
$1,004,835,015
195
$437,987,462
75
43.59% 38.46%
3.52%
$311,762,857
217
$200,655,058
101
64.36% 46.54%
1.09%
$7,718,613,781
1600 $2,402,707,218
622
31.13% 38.88%
27.07%
$1,020,315,505
603
$58,632,040
73
5.75% 12.11%
3.58%
$19,603,510
39
$287,210
1
1.47%
2.56%
0.07%
$2,673,019,694
3944
$177,020,743
172
6.62%
4.36%
9.38%
$1,327,641,370
284
$177,422,181
134
13.36% 47.18%
4.66%
$1,872,012,961
1978
$381,820,710
587
20.40% 29.68%
6.57%
$91,686,291
138
$32,731,166
44
35.70% 31.88%
0.32%
$28,511,634,144 21943 $9,199,368,959 7401
32.27% 33.73%
100.00%

D1A - Type of Entity
Blank
A - Small Disadvantaged in U.S.
B - Other Small in U.S.
C - Large in U.S.
D - JWOD Nonprofit Agency
F - Hospital
L - Foreign Concern/Entity
M - Domestic Firm Outside U.S.
T - Historically Black College
U - Minority Institution
V - Other Educational
Z - Other Nonprofit
Total

FY 2003
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Dollars
$1,549,124,081
2527
$759,373,566
1257
49.02% 49.74%
5.43%
$1,969,279,080
3412
$639,129,131
882
32.45% 25.85%
6.91%
$1,977,648,257
3570
$610,972,697
886
30.89% 24.82%
6.94%
$19,455,047,911 10000 $5,748,012,382 3506
29.55% 35.06%
68.24%
$182,285,964
234
$109,845,413
155
60.26% 66.24%
0.64%
$0
0
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
$547,313,160
913
$163,695,701
263
29.91% 28.81%
1.92%
$1,136,008,192
531
$719,790,367
342
63.36% 64.41%
3.98%
$7,857,520
10
$292,398
1
3.72% 10.00%
0.03%
$23,619,055
27
$278,684
1
1.18%
3.70%
0.08%
$741,796,964
513
$41,179,254
46
5.55%
8.97%
2.60%
$921,653,960
206
$406,799,366
62
44.14% 30.10%
3.23%
$28,511,634,144 21943 $9,199,368,959 7401
32.27% 33.73%
100.00%

105

% Dollars of Total
33.58%
2.23%
3.51%
0.06%
0.17%
0.06%
6.32%
0.00%
8.74%
1.62%
3.35%
2.62%
0.11%
0.00%
0.06%
0.09%
14.90%
4.77%
0.16%
1.05%
9.47%
0.16%
0.07%
6.89%
100.00%

Appendix F: Summary of Percentage of Actions and Dollars PBSA for Service
Category, Type of Contract, and Type of Entity for Fiscal Year 2004

B12A - Service Category
A
B
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Z
Total

FY 2004
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Dollars
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions
$10,189,430,033 5287 $1,055,063,639 1217
10.35% 23.02%
$514,726,664
521
$173,605,864
216
33.73% 41.46%
$1,170,926,890
1422
$485,624,303
550
41.47% 38.68%
$15,361,540
22
$5,624,880
6
0.00%
0.00%
$23,748,131
59
$7,619,569
20
32.08% 33.90%
$14,839,169
20
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$44,170,851
56
$4,628,299
11
10.48% 19.64%
$0
0
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$2,787,632,290
2202
$438,504,910
325
15.73% 14.76%
$370,755,305
238
$103,485,248
42
27.91% 17.65%
$918,150,538
274
$309,530,630
126
33.71% 45.99%
$802,913,906
389
$351,133,681
210
43.73% 53.98%
$15,911,123
54
$1,651,236
6
10.38% 11.11%
$0
0
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
$12,632,205
27
$2,082,612
2
16.49% 7.41%
$33,328,602
107
$11,528,181
35
34.59% 32.71%
$4,387,159,765
4174 $1,495,270,742 1757
34.08% 42.09%
$1,288,053,619
1023
$902,777,998
525
70.09% 51.32%
$35,925,233
77
$7,637,980
17
21.26% 22.08%
$255,153,508
367
$85,236,097
78
33.41% 21.25%
$2,250,437,179
1611 $2,182,552,287 1385
96.98% 85.97%
$23,590,619
66
$9,953,067
14
42.19% 21.21%
$16,633,739
36
$1,451,198
2
8.72%
5.56%
$1,478,510,827
2549
$28,056,133
61
1.90%
2.39%
$26,649,991,736 20581 $7,663,018,554 6605
28.75% 32.09%

C5 - Type of Contract
Blank
A - Firm Fixed Price Redeterm
J - Firm Fixed Price
K - Fixed Price Econ Price Adj
L - Fixed Price Incentive
M - Fixed Price Award Fee
R - Cost Plus Award Fee
S - Cost Contract
T - Cost Sharing
U - Cost Plus Fixed Fee
V - Cost Plus Incentive Fee
Y - Time and Materials
Z - Labor Hour
Total

FY 2004
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Dollars
$1,835,247,266
2603
$774,622,087
1157
42.21% 44.45%
6.89%
$5,694,130
4
$584,248
1
10.26% 25.00%
0.02%
$8,320,539,039
8644 $3,551,485,090 2770
42.68% 32.05%
31.22%
$57,612,003
81
$40,581,918
42
70.44% 51.85%
0.22%
$533,700,092
156
$98,393,381
26
18.44% 16.67%
2.00%
$251,423,539
157
$138,131,128
80
54.94% 50.96%
0.94%
$6,822,988,443
1419 $1,455,474,240
482
21.33% 33.97%
25.60%
$1,348,607,615
831
$265,036,550
187
19.65% 22.50%
5.06%
$21,750,240
32
$3,261,066
9
14.99% 28.13%
0.08%
$4,059,934,898
4299
$710,685,413
1225
17.50% 28.49%
15.23%
$1,138,326,852
295
$263,135,801
141
23.12% 47.80%
4.27%
$2,152,576,133
1885
$332,187,028
432
15.43% 22.92%
8.08%
$101,591,486
175
$29,440,604
53
28.98% 30.29%
0.38%
$26,649,991,736 20581 $7,663,018,554 6605
28.75% 32.09%
100.00%

D1A - Type of Entity
Blank
A - Small Disadvantaged in U.S.
B - Other Small in U.S.
C - Large in U.S.
D - JWOD Nonprofit Agency
F - Hospital
L - Foreign Concern/Entity
M - Domestic Firm Outside U.S.
T - Historically Black College
U - Minority Institution
V - Other Educational
Z - Other Nonprofit
Total

FY 2004
Total
PBSA
% PBSA
Actions
Dollars
Actions Dollars Actions % Dollars by Total
Dollars
$1,835,247,266
2,603
$774,622,087
1,157 42.21% 44.45%
6.89%
$1,708,032,459
3023
$434,865,318
603
25.46% 19.95%
6.41%
$2,222,974,939
3625
$817,337,558
1188
36.77% 32.77%
8.34%
$17,160,563,691 9136 $4,492,855,188 2958
26.18% 32.38%
64.39%
$185,737,008
203
$46,138,363
66
24.84% 32.51%
0.70%
$0
0
$0
0
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
$569,502,895
742
$155,959,853
230
27.39% 31.00%
2.14%
$1,059,490,953
399
$663,788,582
201
62.65% 50.38%
3.98%
$258,409
2
$119,999
1
46.44% 50.00%
0.00%
$29,367,435
46
$2,590,740
9
8.82% 19.57%
0.11%
$858,241,084
583
$213,364,499
106
24.86% 18.18%
3.22%
$1,020,575,597
219
$61,376,367
86
6.01% 39.27%
3.83%
$26,649,991,736 20581 $7,663,018,554 6605
28.75% 32.09%
100.00%

106

% Dollars of Total
38.23%
1.93%
4.39%
0.06%
0.09%
0.06%
0.17%
0.00%
10.46%
1.39%
3.45%
3.01%
0.06%
0.00%
0.05%
0.13%
16.46%
4.83%
0.13%
0.96%
8.44%
0.09%
0.06%
5.55%
100.00%

Bundled Contract Exception

Bundled Contract

Appendix G: Contingency Tables
PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
N
54260 22267
70.71 29.02
99.87 99.38
70.90 29.10
Y
140
71
0.18
0.09
0.62
0.13
33.65 66.35
54331 22407
70.80 29.20
PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
54287 22309
70.74 29.07
99.92 99.56
70.87 29.13
A
1
16
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.07
5.88 94.12
B
10
59
0.01
0.08
0.02
0.26
14.49 85.51
C
23
33
0.03
0.04
0.10
0.06
58.93 41.07
54331 22407
70.80 29.20
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76527
99.73

211
0.27

76738

76596
99.81

17
0.02

69
0.09

56
0.07

76738

Multi-Year Contract

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
N
54325 22404
70.79 29.20
99.99 99.99
70.80 29.20
Y
3
6
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
66.67 33.33
54331 22407
70.80 29.20

108

76729
99.99

9
0.01

76738

PBSA
Count N
Total %
Col %
Row %
1

3

4

Contract/Order

5

6

7

8

9

Y

352
0.46
0.65
84.82
20675
26.94
38.05
76.96
768
1.00
1.41
87.47
26104
34.02
48.05
69.37
4714
6.14
8.68
55.13
99
0.13
0.18
73.88
173
0.23
0.32
47.27
1446
1.88
2.66
76.23
54331
70.80

109

63
0.08
0.28
15.18
6191
8.07
27.63
23.04
110
0.14
0.49
12.53
11528
15.02
51.45
30.63
3836
5.00
17.12
44.87
35
0.05
0.16
26.12
193
0.25
0.86
52.73
451
0.59
2.01
23.77
22407
29.20

415
0.54

26866
35.01

878
1.14

37632
49.04

8550
11.14

134
0.17

366
0.48

1897
2.47

76738

Type IDIQ

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
26046 10195
33.94 13.29
47.94 45.50
71.87 28.13
A
2478
6368
3.23
8.30
11.72 11.06
71.99 28.01
B
9552
21174
27.59 12.45
38.97 42.63
68.91 31.09
C
743
182
0.97
0.24
1.37
0.81
80.32 19.68
54331 22407
70.80 29.20

110

36241
47.23

8846
11.53

30726
40.04

925
1.21

76738

Multiple Award Fair Op

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
48895 16618
63.72 21.66
89.99 74.16
74.63 25.37
A
915
4380
1.19
5.71
4.08
8.06
82.72 17.28
B
12
19
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.03
61.29 38.71
C
196
451
0.26
0.59
0.87
0.83
69.71 30.29
D
521
408
0.68
0.53
2.33
0.75
43.92 56.08
E
4145
178
5.40
0.23
0.33 18.50
4.12 95.88
54331 22407
70.80 29.20

111

65513
85.37

5295
6.90

31
0.04

647
0.84

929
1.21

4323
5.63

76738

Indefinite Delivery Contract Use
Synopsis

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
47869 16801
62.38 21.89
88.11 74.98
74.02 25.98
A
160
276
0.21
0.36
0.71
0.51
63.30 36.70
B
124
383
0.16
0.50
0.55
0.70
75.54 24.46
C
269
498
0.35
0.65
1.20
0.92
64.93 35.07
D
5053
5305
6.58
6.91
9.76 22.55
51.22 48.78
54331 22407
70.80 29.20
PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
3859
4757
5.03
6.20
8.76 17.22
55.21 44.79
A
31636 13350
41.23 17.40
58.23 59.58
70.32 29.68
B
1167
3773
1.52
4.92
5.21
6.94
76.38 23.62
N
4031
14165
5.25
18.46
26.07 17.99
77.85 22.15
54331 22407
70.80 29.20

112

64670
84.27

436
0.57

507
0.66

767
1.00

10358
13.50

76738

8616
11.23

44986
58.62

4940
6.44

18196
23.71

76738

Reason Not Synopsized

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
40166 18376
52.34 23.95
73.93 82.01
68.61 31.39
A
112
454
0.15
0.59
0.50
0.84
80.21 19.79
B
38
202
0.05
0.26
0.17
0.37
84.17 15.83
C
31
111
0.04
0.14
0.14
0.20
78.17 21.83
Z
3850
13398
5.02
17.46
24.66 17.18
77.68 22.32
54331 22407
70.80 29.20

113

58542
76.29

566
0.74

240
0.31

142
0.19

17248
22.48

76738

PBSA
Count N
Total %
Col %
Row %
?

Extent Competed

A

B

C

D

Y

43
0.06
0.08
65.15
41238
53.74
75.90
68.67
4900
6.39
9.02
73.68
1241
1.62
2.28
82.84
6909
9.00
12.72
81.58
54331
70.80

114

23
0.03
0.10
34.85
18817
24.52
83.98
31.33
1750
2.28
7.81
26.32
257
0.33
1.15
17.16
1560
2.03
6.96
18.42
22407
29.20

66
0.09

60055
78.26

6650
8.67

1498
1.95

8469
11.04

76738

Type of Contract

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
4757
3859
6.20
5.03
8.76 17.22
55.21 44.79
A
40
6
0.05
0.01
0.07
0.03
86.96 13.04
J
22451 11556
29.26 15.06
41.32 51.57
66.02 33.98
K
263
211
0.34
0.27
0.48
0.94
55.49 44.51
L
485
157
0.63
0.20
0.89
0.70
75.55 24.45
M
371
321
0.48
0.42
0.68
1.43
53.61 46.39
R
3817
1843
4.97
2.40
7.03
8.23
67.44 32.56
S
1991
292
2.59
0.38
3.66
1.30
87.21 12.79
T
158
14
0.21
0.02
0.29
0.06
91.86
8.14
U
13366
1841
17.42
2.40
24.60
8.22
87.89 12.11
V
587
315
0.76
0.41
1.08
1.41
65.08 34.92
Y
5507
1716
7.18
2.24
10.14
7.66
76.24 23.76
Z
538
276
0.70
0.36
0.99
1.23
66.09 33.91
54331 22407
70.80 29.20

115

8616
11.23

46
0.06

34007
44.32

474
0.62

642
0.84

692
0.90

5660
7.38

2283
2.98

172
0.22

15207
19.82

902
1.18

7223
9.41

814
1.06

76738

Solicitation Procedures

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
6993
4491
9.11
5.85
12.87 20.04
60.89 39.11
A
934
167
1.22
0.22
1.72
0.75
84.83 15.17
B
19574
6173
25.51
8.04
36.03 27.55
76.02 23.98
C
195
46
0.25
0.06
0.36
0.21
80.91 19.09
D
3
0
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
100.00
0.00
E
4984
453
6.49
0.59
9.17
2.02
91.67
8.33
F
481
89
0.63
0.12
0.89
0.40
84.39 15.61
G
40
23
0.05
0.03
0.07
0.10
63.49 36.51
K
8687
3088
11.32
4.02
15.99 13.78
73.77 26.23
N
12440
7877
16.21 10.26
22.90 35.15
61.23 38.77
54331 22407
70.80 29.20

116

11484
14.97

1101
1.43

25747
33.55

241
0.31

3
0.00

5437
7.09

570
0.74

63
0.08

11775
15.34

20317
26.48

76738

Commercial Items

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
5006
3961
6.52
5.16
9.21 17.68
55.83 44.17
N
45035 14544
58.69 18.95
82.89 64.91
75.59 24.41
Y
3902
4290
5.08
5.59
7.90 17.41
52.37 47.63
54331 22407
70.80 29.20

117

8967
11.69

59579
77.64

8192
10.68

76738

Type on Entity

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
3859
4757
5.03
6.20
8.76 17.22
55.21 44.79
A
2599
8832
3.39
11.51
16.26 11.60
77.26 22.74
B
9871
3219
12.86
4.19
18.17 14.37
75.41 24.59
C
25092 10157
32.70 13.24
46.18 45.33
71.18 28.82
D
399
422
0.52
0.55
1.78
0.78
51.40 48.60
F
4
0
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00 100.00
L
860
2159
1.12
2.81
3.84
3.97
71.51 28.49
M
844
735
1.10
0.96
3.77
1.35
46.55 53.45
T
3
23
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.04
88.46 11.54
U
13
109
0.02
0.14
0.06
0.20
89.34 10.66
V
192
1759
0.25
2.29
0.86
3.24
9.84
90.16
Z
572
258
0.75
0.34
1.05
1.15
68.92 31.08
54331 22407
70.80 29.20

118

8616
11.23

11431
14.90

13090
17.06

35249
45.93

821
1.07

4
0.01

3019
3.93

1579
2.06

26
0.03

122
0.16

1951
2.54

830
1.08

76738

Woman-Owned Business
HUBZone Representation

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
4757
3859
6.20
5.03
8.76 17.22
55.21 44.79
N
46464 17300
60.55 22.54
85.52 77.21
72.87 27.13
U
702
362
0.91
0.47
1.29
1.62
65.98 34.02
Y
2408
886
3.14
1.15
4.43
3.95
73.10 26.90
54331 22407
70.80 29.20
PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
35628 16589
46.43 21.62
65.58 74.03
68.23 31.77
N
5354
16766
6.98
21.85
30.86 23.89
75.80 24.20
Y
464
1937
0.60
2.52
2.07
3.57
80.67 19.33
54331 22407
70.80 29.20

119

8616
11.23

63764
83.09

1064
1.39

3294
4.29

76738

52217
68.05

22120
28.83

2401
3.13

76738

Ethnic Group

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
45530 19856
59.33 25.88
83.80 88.62
69.63 30.37
A
109
385
0.14
0.50
0.49
0.71
77.94 22.06
B
358
868
0.47
1.13
1.60
1.60
70.80 29.20
C
595
1587
0.78
2.07
2.66
2.92
72.73 27.27
D
441
1882
0.57
2.45
1.97
3.46
81.02 18.98
E
2598
663
3.39
0.86
4.78
2.96
79.67 20.33
F
105
500
0.65
0.14
0.92
0.47
82.64 17.36
Z
981
280
1.28
0.36
1.81
1.25
77.80 22.20
54331 22407
70.80 29.20
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65386
85.21

494
0.64

1226
1.60

2182
2.84

2323
3.03

3261
4.25

605
0.79

1261
1.64

76738

Type of Set-Aside

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
4757
3859
6.20
5.03
8.76 17.22
55.21 44.79
A
37237 14272
48.52 18.60
68.54 63.69
72.29 27.71
B
2361
5229
3.08
6.81
9.62 10.54
68.89 31.11
C
71
279
0.09
0.36
0.32
0.51
79.71 20.29
D
6151
1664
8.02
2.17
11.32
7.43
78.71 21.29
E
214
56
0.28
0.07
0.39
0.25
79.26 20.74
F
73
12
0.10
0.02
0.13
0.05
85.88 14.12
K
90
298
0.12
0.39
0.40
0.55
76.80 23.20
L
22
93
0.03
0.12
0.10
0.17
80.87 19.13
54331 22407
70.80 29.20
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8616
11.23

51509
67.12

7590
9.89

350
0.46

7815
10.18

270
0.35

85
0.11

388
0.51

115
0.15

76738

Type of Preference

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
4757
3859
6.20
5.03
8.76 17.22
55.21 44.79
A
49556 18544
64.58 24.17
91.21 82.76
72.77 27.23
B
3
1
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
75.00 25.00
D
15
3
0.02
0.00
0.03
0.01
83.33 16.67
54331 22407
70.80 29.20
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8616
11.23

68100
88.74

4
0.01

18
0.02

76738

SBIR Program

PBSA
Count N
Y
Total %
Col %
Row %
?
5055
4001
6.59
5.21
9.30 17.86
55.82 44.18
A
46746 17932
60.92 23.37
86.04 80.03
72.27 27.73
B
47
8
0.06
0.01
0.09
0.04
85.45 14.55
C
2362
449
3.08
0.59
4.35
2.00
84.03 15.97
D
17
121
0.02
0.16
0.08
0.22
87.68 12.32
54331 22407
70.80 29.20

9056
11.80

64678
84.28

55
0.07

2811
3.66

138
0.18

76738

Any row with an “?” indicates that no code was selected for that variable for that
particular action.
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Appendix H: Parameter Estimates for Logistic Regression Model without Unstable
or Biased Variables.
Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
B1C - Bundled Contract [N]
B13B - Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract [A]
B13B - Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract [B]
B13B - Type of Indefinite-Delivery Contract [C]
B13E - Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity
B13E - Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity
B13E - Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity
B13E - Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity
B13E - Multiple Award Contract Fair Opportunity
B13F - Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use [A]
B13F - Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use [B]
B13F - Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use [C]
B13F - Indefinite-Delivery Contract Use [D]
C14 - Commercial Items [N]
C14 - Commercial Items [Y]
D1C - HUBZone Representation [N]
D1C - HUBZone Representation [Y]
D1D - Ethnic Group [A]
D1D - Ethnic Group [B]
D1D - Ethnic Group [C]
D1D - Ethnic Group [D]
D1D - Ethnic Group [E]
D1D - Ethnic Group [F]
D1D - Ethnic Group [Z]
D7 - SBIR Program [A]
D7 - SBIR Program [B]
D7 - SBIR Program [C]
D7 - SBIR Program [D]

[A]
[B]
[C]
[D]
[E]

For log odds of H/M
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Estimate
1.15945266
-1.0217948
0.11027158
0.00593461
-0.2293267
-1.4259021
-0.3498394
-0.6077224
0.37374773
3.24672216
0.0541297
-0.2464587
0.36786891
0.07654513
-0.4662438
0.94984336
0.11716142
-0.2752741
0.12115866
0.32562806
0.20367995
-0.259404
0.07389066
-0.5987701
-0.000672
-0.0412664
-0.3835844
-0.2049099
-0.5647882

Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
0.1493497
60.27
<.0001
0.0742649
189.30
<.0001
0.029991
13.52
0.0002
0.0269594
0.05
0.8258
0.0658999
12.11
0.0005
0.0733505
377.90
<.0001
0.3140916
1.24
0.2654
0.0975302
38.83
<.0001
0.0867607
18.56
<.0001
0.0928443
1222.9
<.0001
0.089726
0.36
0.5463
0.0939629
6.88
0.0087
0.0720396
26.08
<.0001
0.0420865
3.31
0.0689
0.072445
41.42
<.0001
0.0739473
164.99
<.0001
0.0222081
27.83
<.0001
0.0397144
48.04
<.0001
0.1018073
1.42
0.2340
0.0639912
25.89
<.0001
0.0518348
15.44
<.0001
0.0562419
21.27
<.0001
0.0475593
2.41
0.1203
0.1075247
31.01
<.0001
0.0673468
0.00
0.9920
0.1044959
0.16
0.6929
0.3166887
1.47
0.2258
0.1111629
3.40
0.0653
0.2275421
6.16
0.0131
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